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I. INTRODUCTION
Times change. During the first half of the twentieth century, a homo-
sexual would be marked as a "presumptive sodomite," a "gender invert
believed to be biologically degenerate," or a "sexual psychopath" in the
face of society and the law.' Even throughout the 1980s homosexuality
was understood as a ground for exclusion from immigration.' As recently
as ten years ago, laws criminalizing consensual homosexual relations re-
mained in effect in a number of states.' Today, the situation is markedly
different and gay rights advocates can claim a number of groundbreaking
victories in the fight for social justice and legal equality.
1. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Dis-
course and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rrv. 1327, 1335 (2000).
2. See Gay and Lesbian Immigrants: Late Twentieth and Early Twenty-First Century
Issues, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IMMIoR. (Dec. 12, 2011), http://immigration-online.org/515-gay-
and-lesbian-immigrants.html (discussing the challenges homosexuals faced when seeking
to immigrate to the United States). The exclusion of homosexuals from immigration has
an interesting history. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1940 denied immigration
benefits to those who could not demonstrate good moral character but it did not specifi-
cally include homosexuality. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the
Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship,
1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 817, 930 (1997) (examining the language of the 1940 Act).
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter Act) prohibited immigra-
tion into the United States of those "afflicted with psychopathic personality." Immigration
and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 182 (re-
pealed 1990). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.) interpreted this lan-
guage to exclude homosexuals and bisexuals. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the
Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos,
and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 817, 930 (1997). A number of cases un-
successfully challenged this interpretation. Id. at 930-31; Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d
652, 658 (9th Cir. 1962). To strengthen the I.N.S. interpretation of the law, Congress added
"sexual deviation" as a basis for exclusion in 1965. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Challenging
the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos,
and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HoESTRA L. Riv. 817, 932 (1997). The Supreme Court
firmly set homosexuality as a ground for exclusion from immigration in 1967. Id. at
931-32; Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 118 (1967) (hold-
ing that homosexuality is covered in the Immigration and Nationality Act under the "psy-
chopathic personality" provision). In later years the situation improved with the I.N.S.'s
"ingenious don't ask, don't tell policy" which stated that "[a]n alien shall not be asked any
questions concerning his or her sexual preference during primary inspection." William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing Conditions for Lesbian
and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-1981, 25 HovsTrnA L. Rev. 817, 937
(1997). For those whose homosexuality was known, the I.N.S. adopted a policy of rou-
tinely granting waivers of excludability. Id. at 939. Finally, the Immigration Act of 1990
removed homosexuality as a ground for exclusion from immigration to the United States.
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5067 (1990).
3. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) ("The 25 States with laws prohibiting
the conduct referenced in Bowers are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only
against homosexual conduct.").
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In terms of social acceptance, research today shows that the majority of
the population in the United States accepts homosexuality.' Gallup's
May 2010 opinion poll showed that 62% of men and 59% of women be-
tween the ages of eighteen and forty-nine consider gay relations "morally
acceptable." 5 The number of people who report having a gay friend or
close acquaintance rose from 22% in 1985 to 60% in 2012.6 As to part-
nerships, the support for civil unions has also grown rapidly.' The Pew
Research Center reported that while only 49% of Americans supported
civil unions in 2004, five years later support reached 57%.' Furthermore,
a number of agencies now report majority support for same-sex
marriage.9
In tandem with social acceptance, legal protection for homosexuals is
stronger than ever. The 1990s started a legal revolution in gay rights that
is still occurring today. The Immigration Act of 1990 did away with ho-
mosexuality as a ground for exclusion from immigration.o Romer v. Ev-
ans"1 made clear that mere moral disapproval of homosexuality is an
illegitimate government purpose under rational basis scrutiny.' 2 With the
invalidation of Texas's sodomy law in Lawrence v. Texas," the Supreme
4. Elizabeth O'Brien & John-Henry Westen, Gallup Poll Shows Highest-Ever Accept-
ance of Homosexuality in America, Liwn SriE NEws (May 30, 2007), http://www.
lifesitenews.com/news/archive/idn/2007/may/07053003.
5. Lydia Saad, Americans' Acceptance of Gay Relations Crosses 50% Threshold, GAL-
eup (May 25, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/135764/americans-acceptance-gay-rela-
tions-crosses-threshold.aspx.
6. Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKF L. REv. 923, 940
(2010); CNN Poll: Americans' Attitudes Toward Gay Community Changing, CNN (June 6,
2012), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/06/cnn-poll-americans-attitudes-toward-
gay-community-changing/.
7. Majority Continues to Support Civil Unions: Most Still Oppose Same-Sex Marriage,
PEw RES. CENTER (Oct. 9, 2009), http://www.people-press.org/2009/10/09/majority-contin-
ues-to-support-civil-unions/.
8. Id.
9. Same-Sex Marriage, Gay Rights, POLLINGREPORT, http://www.pollingreport.com/
civil.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) (indicating that in Washington Post's polls 52% of re-
spondents favored allowing same-sex couples to marry); CNN Poll: Americans' Attitudes
Toward Gay Community Changing, CNN (June 6, 2012), http://politicalticker.blogs.
cnn.com/2012/06/06/cnn-poll-americans-attitudes-toward-gay-community-changing/ (indi-
cating that in a CNN poll 54% of respondents favored legal recognition of same-sex
marriage).
10. Brian J. McGoldrick, United States Immigration Policy and Sexual Orientation: Is
Asylum for Homosexuals a Possibility?, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201, 201 (1994) (showing that
while "Congress wished to remove homosexuality as a ground for exclusion" with the 1990
Act, it was not at first clear whether the Act's wording would actually achieve that goal).
11. 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
12. Id.
13. 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003).
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Court recognized constitutional protection of the most fundamental inci-
dent of homosexuality-sexual expression.1 4 Today, being homosexual
does not prevent any American from participation in the armed forces."
Both social and legal acceptance of homosexuality have reached such a
high level that, according to the Westboro Baptist Church, "God
hates ... the United States for its tolerance of homosexuality."' 6 We can
assume that future legislation and court rulings will further irritate the
nerve of this extremist group."
The next logical step in the fight for gay rights is national recognition of
the familial relationships of homosexuals. Gays and lesbians are now en-
gaged in a vocal legal and political fight for marriage equality-a concept
unthought-of a mere generation ago.1 " It has been less than a decade
14. Id.
15. See James Dao, Don't Ask, Don't Tell Ends This Week With Celebrations, Revela-
tions and Questions, N.Y. TIMEs BLoG (Sept. 19, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://
atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/dont-ask-dont-tell-ends-this-week-with-celebrations-
revelations-and-questions (reporting that the policy was repealed in 2011); Elizabeth Bu-
miller, Obama Ends 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Policy, N.Y. TIMf-s, July 23, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/23military.html (detailing the end of the "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy). For a number of years homosexuals were not permitted to serve
openly in the military. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006), repealed by Pub. L. 111-321,
§ 2(f)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 3516 (2011) (listing the United States policy on homosexuals serving
in the military); Dep't of Defense Directive 1332.14 (1982) (Enlisted Administrative Sepa-
rations (Dec. 21, 1993)), available at http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/regulation41.pdf
(banning homosexuals and bisexuals from serving in the military before the new policy in
1993); Robert 1. Correales, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: A Dying Policy on the Precipice, 44 CAL.
W. L. REv. 413, 415, 417 (2008) (reporting that President Clinton introduced "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" in 1993 and that the policy allowed homosexuals who were not open about
their sexual orientation to serve in the military).
16. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011).
17. The Anti-Defamation League, whose mission it is to "scrutinize[ I and expose[
extremists and hate groups," termed the Westboro Baptist Church a "hate group." About
the Anti-Defamation League, ADL, http://www.adl.orglabout.asp?s=topmenu (last visited
Oct. 3, 2012); see also Westboro Baptist Church, At, http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_us/
WBC/default.asp?LEARNCat=Extremism&LEARN (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) (describ-
ing the Westboro Baptist Church as "a small virulently homophobic, anti-Semitic hate
group that regularly stages protests around the country."). As to future legislation, there
have been numerous attempts in Congress to repeal the Defense of Marriage Act-a stat-
ute that limits marriage to opposite-sex couples for purposes of federal law. See 1 U.S.C.
§ 7 (2006) ("[T]he word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one
woman."); Respect for Marriage Act of 2011, S. 598, 112th Cong. (2011) (asserting the
desire to repeal DOMA). The Defense of Marriage Act was also being challenged judi-
cially in the First Circuit. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 698 F.
Supp. 2d 234, 235 (D. Mass. 2010); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgnt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 374
(D. Mass. 2010).
18. While the concept of same-sex marriage found its way to the courts in the 1970s
and 1980s, it was not until 1996 with Baehr v. Miike that the possibility of victory in the
arena of same-sex marriage litigation became realistic for gay rights advocates. Baehr v.
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since Massachusetts became the first state to allow gay and lesbian
couples to legally marry." Today, nine states-Maine,2 0 Maryland,2 1
Massachusetts,2 2 Connecticut, Iowa,2 4 New Hampshire,2 S New York, 6
Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (holding that a
limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the Hawaii Constitution); but see
Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that "section 201(b)
of the Act is not unconstitutional because it denies spouses of homo-sexual marriages the
preferences accorded to spouses of heterosexual marriages."); Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588, 589-90 (Ky. 1973) (upholding Kentucky's refusal to issue a marriage license to
a same-sex couple); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185-87 (Minn. 1971) (holding that
neither state statutes nor the U.S. Constitution authorized same-sex marriage).
19. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968-69 (2003) (validating
same-sex marriages in Massachusetts). As a result of the Goodridge decision, Massachu-
setts began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples on May 17, 2004. Pam Belluck,
Massachusetts Arrives at Moment for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMis, May 17, 2004, http://
www.nytimes.com/2004/05/1 7/us/massachusetts-arrives-at-moment-for-same-sex-marriage.
html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
20. In November 2012, Maine, together with Maryland and Washington, became the
first states to legalize same-sex marriage by a ballot vote. Alana Semuels, Voters OK Gay
Marriage in Maine, Maryland, L.A. Times (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/news/
nationworld/nation/la-na-gay-marriage-20121107,0,1194693.story.
21. Maryland originally approved same-sex marriage legislatively. Aaron C. Davis,
Maryland Senate Passes Same-Sex Bill, WAStI. Pos-r, Feb. 23, 2012, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/maryland-senate-passes-same-sex-marriagebill/2012/02/
23/glQAfbakWR-story.html (announcing the passage of the Maryland statute and reac-
tions from both sides of the debate); Reuters, Maryland: Same-Sex Marriage Signed into
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2012, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9CO5E2
DD1F30F931A35750C0A9649D8B63 (announcing Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley
signed a same-sex marriage bill into law on March 1, 2012). The oppoisition vouched to
challenge the law in a referendum. Sabrina Tavernise, In Maryland, House Passes Bill to
Allow Gays to Wed, N.Y. TimSs, Feb. 17, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/us/ma-
ryland-house-approves-gay-marriage-measure.html (announcing the passage of Maryland's
statute that allows same sex couples to marry beginning in 2013, which the opposition
hopes to challenge in a referendum in November 2012). On November 6, 2012, a majority
of Maryland voters voted to legalize same-sex marriage. Alana Semuels, Voters OK Gay
Marriage in Maine, Maryland, L.A. TIMus (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/news/
nationworld/nation/la-na-gay-marriage-20121107,0,11 9 46 93 .story. Besides Maryland, the
New Jersey legislature passed a bill allowing same-sex marriage in 2012; however, the bill
was vetoed by Governor Chris Christie. Kate Zarnike, Christie Keeps His Promise to Veto
Gay Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIM1.s, Feb. 18, 2012, at Al9.
22. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968-69 (redefining civil marriage to be a voluntary
union between two spouses as to the exclusion of other individuals).
23. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008) (holding that
restriction of marriage rights to opposite-sex couples violates same-sex couples' state con-
stitutional rights). In 2009, the Connecticut legislature withdrew the old marriage law that
had been invalidated by the court and replaced it with a gender-neutral counterpart.
Chase Matthews, Connecticut Gov. Signs Gay Marriage Into Law, CHICAGoPRIDIu (Apr.
23, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://chicago.gopride.com/news/article.cfm/articleid/7272400.
24. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d. 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (striking statutory language
that banned same-sex marriage because it violated the state's constitution). Iowa began
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Vermont,' and Washington 2 8-and the District of Columbia' permit
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples on April 27, 2009. See Monica Davey, A
Quiet Day in Iowa As Same-Sex Couples Line Up to Marry, N.Y. TIMiEs, Apr. 27, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/us/28marriage.html?_r=0 (discussing the first day Iowa
began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples).
25. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (LexisNexis Supp. 2011). The statute states that
"[miarriage is the legally recognized union of 2 people" and "[any person ... may marry
any other eligible person regardless of gender." Id. Governor John Lynch signed the law
on June 3, 2009. Press Release, New Hampshire Government, Governor Lynch Statement
Regarding Same-Sex Marriage Legislation Singed into Law Today (June 3, 2009) (on file
with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice), available at http://
www.governor.nh.gov/medialnews/2009/060309_marriage.htm.
26. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 10-a (McKinney 2011) ("A marriage that is otherwise
valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or
different sex."). New York began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in July
2011 and is one of the largest states so far to do so. Nicholas Confessore & Michael
Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y.
Times, June 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/nyregion/gay-marriage-ap-
proved-by-new-york-senate.html?pagewanted=all.
27. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (1999) (holding that "exclusion of same-sex
couples from the benefits incident to a civil marriage" violates the state constitution). On
July 1, 2000, as a response to Baker, Vermont became the first state to grant civil unions to
same-sex couples with the same legal rights and responsibilities of marriage. Carey
Goldberg, In Vermont, Gay Couples Head for the Almost-Altar, N.Y. TimEs, July 2, 2000,
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/02/us/in-vermont-gay-couples-head-for-the-almost-altar.
html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. Years later, in a heated exchange between the Vermont
legislature and the state's Governor, the state legislature overruled the Governor's veto of
a bill legalizing same-sex marriage. Gay Marriage Advances in Vermont and the District,
WASI . PosT, Apr. 8, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/
07/AR2009040703434.html. In 2009, Vermont then became "the first state to legally recog-
nize gay marriage through a legislative act rather than a court order." Id.
28. Similar to Maryland, Washington's legislature initially approved same-sex mar-
riage. Associated Press, Washington: Foes of Gay Marriage Vow to Fight Law, N.Y. TIMe2s,
Feb. 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/us/washington-foes-of-gay-marriage-vow-
fight-measure.html (explaining the opposition's plan to repeal the recently passed same-
sex marriage legislation). Opponents sought to challenge the measure by a ballot vote.
Kim Murphy, Washington State Makes 7: Governor Signs Gay Marriage Law, L.A. TIMiES
(Feb. 13, 2012, 2:12 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2012/02/washington-
governor-signs-law-legalizing-same-sex-marriage.html; Reuters, Washington: Gay Marriage
Legalized, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/us/washington-
gay-marriage-legalized.html (reporting that the state of Washington would begin perform-
ing same-sex marriages on June 7, 2012, unless opponents collect the necessary signatures
to put the law to a referendum in November). Voters approved of same-sex marriage in the
November 2012 elections. Elizabeth Hartfield, Washington Approves Same-Sex Marriage,
Marking Shift in Nation's Views, ABC NEws, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/ 11/
washington-approves-same-sex-marriage-marking-shift-in-nations-views/.
29. D.C. Coom' § 46-401(a)-(b) (Supp. 2009) ("Marriage is the legally recognized
union of 2 persons" and "[alny person may enter into a marriage in the District of Colum-
bia with another person, regardless of gender."). See Jackson v. D.C. Bd. of Elections and
Ethics, 999 A.2d 89, 120 (D.C. 2010) (holding that an initiative seeking to define marriage
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same-sex marriages.3 0 At the same time, a number of states have passed
constitutional amendments that limit marriage to opposite sex couples.3
as between a man and a woman on a ballot would violate the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act, signifying another major victory for same-sex marriages); Victory for Gay Mar-
riage in D.C., ADVOCATE (July 15, 2010, 11:10 AM), http://www.advocate.com/news/daily-
news/2010/07/15/victory-gay-marriage-dc.
30. See Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws,
NAT'L CONF. oF, S-r. LEGIsLATUREs, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16430 (last up-
dated June 2012) (listing the states that offer marriage licenses to same-sex couples).
31. ALA. CONs-r. amend. 774 ("Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a
man and a woman."); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 ("[A] marriage may exist only between
one man and one woman."); Aiwz. CONs-r. art. 30, § I ("Only a union of one man and one
woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage."); ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1 ("Mar-
riage consists only of the union of one man and one woman."); CAL. CONsr. art. I, § 7.5
("Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized."); COLo. CoNST. art.
II, § 31 ("Only a union of one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a
marriage."); FLA. CONS-. art. I, § 27 ("[Mjarriage is the legal union of only one man and
one woman . . . ."); GA. CONsT. art. 1, § 4, para. I ("This state shall recognize as marriage
only the union of man and woman."); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("The legislature shall have
the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples."); IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28 ("A
marriage between a man and a woman is the only domestic legal union that shall be valid
or recognized .... "); KAN. CONs-r. art. 15, § 16 ("Marriage shall be constituted by one man
and one woman only."); Ky. CONsT. § 233A ("Only a marriage between one man and one
woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage .... ); LA. CONsT. art. 12, § 15 ("Mar-
riage . . . shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman."); MICI. CONST.
§ 1.1(25) ("[T]he union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agree-
ment recognized as a marriage."); MIss. CONs. art. 14, § 263A ("Marriage may take place
and may be valid . .. only between a man and a woman."); Mo. CONsu. art. 1, § 33 ("[Al
marriage shall exist only between a man and a woman."); MONT. CONST. art. 13, § 7 ("Only
a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage.");
NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 ("Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or
recognized . . . ."); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21 ("Only a marriage between a male and female
person shall be recognized and given effect . . . ."); N.C. CONs. art VIX, § 6 ("Marriage
between one man and one woman is the only domestic legal union that shall be valid or
recognized in this State."); N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28 ("Marriage consists only of the legal
union between a man and a woman."); Om-1o CONSr. art. XV, § 11 ("Only a union between
one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized."); OKLA. CONST. art. 2
§ 35 ("Marriage . . . shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman."); OR.
CONST. art. XV, § 5a ("[O]nly a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid
or legally recognized."); S.C. CONs-r. art. XVII, § 15 ("A marriage between one man and
one woman is the only lawful domestic union."); S.D. CONsr. art. 17, § 9 ("Only marriage
between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized by this state."); TENN. CONST.
art. XI, § 18 ("The historical institution and legal contract solemnizing the relationship of
one (1) man and one (1) woman shall be the only legally recognized marital contract.");
TEX. CONS-F. art. I, § 32 ("Marriage ... shall consist only of the union of one man and one
woman."); UTAH CONsr. art. I, § 29 ("Marriage consists only of the legal union between a
man and a woman."); VA. CONS-T. art. I, § 15-A ("[O]nly a union between one man and
one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by the state."); Wis. CONsT. art. 13,
§ 13 ("Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a
marriage."). North Carolina was the last state to pass a similar constitutional amendment
2013] 299
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Such amendments are targets of legal challenges by gay rights activists. 2
The Ninth Circuit has invalidated one such amendment. In February
2012, the court invalidated California's marriage amendment put in place
by the infamous Proposition 8.34 The court found the state's withdrawal
of previously granted same-sex marriage rights unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds.35 With a narrow holding tailored to the unusual situ-
banning same sex marriages and civil unions on May 8, 2012. North Carolina's Proposition
One stated that "[mJarriage between one man and one woman is the only domestic legal
union that shall be valid or recognized." Nate Silver, North Carolina's Ban on Gay Mar-
riage Appears Likely to Pass, N.Y. Timws BLOC (May 4, 2012, 1:51 PM), http://fivethirty
eight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/04/north-carolinas-ban-on-gay-marriage-appears-likely-
to-pass/. Scholars refer to such state constitutional amendments as "mini-DOMAs" in
light of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)-a congressional act that limits marriage to
opposite-sex couples for purposes of federal law. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, The Dif-
ference the Mini-DOMAs Make, 38 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 265, 265 (2007) (discussing the im-
pact of state legislation on same-sex marriages). One state-Minnesota-successfully
defeated a proposed ballot measure that would add a constitutional provision limiting mar-
riage to opposite-sex couples. Lila Shapiro, Gay Marriage Victory in Maine, Maryland;
Minnesota Votes Down 'Traditional' Amendment, Huffington Post (Nov. 7, 2012), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/gay-marriage-victory-n 2085900.htmi.
32. See Gabriel Arana, Gay on Trial, THE AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 20, 2009), http://pros-
pect.org/article/gay-trial (illustrating how gay-rights leaders shifted their focus to state
courts and the ballot box).
33. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding California's mar-
riage amendment unconstitutional).
34. Id.; see Adam Nagourney, Court Strikes Down Ban on Gay Marriage in California,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/us/marriage-ban-violates-con-
stitution-court-rules.html?_r=0 (analyzing the Ninth Circuit's holding); see also Michael J.
Ritter, Article, Perry v, Schwarzenegger: Trying Same-Sex Marriage, 13 SCHOLAR 363,
365-66 (2010) (chronicling same-sex marriage in California); M.K.B. Darmer & Tiffany
Chang, Article, Moving Beyond the "Immutability Debate" in the Fight For Equality After
Proposition 8, 12 SCHOLAR 1, 3440 (2009).
35. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1096 ("By using their initiative power to target a minority group
and withdraw a right that it possessed, without a legitimate reason for doing so, the People
of California violated the Equal Protection Clause."). In 2000, California adopted Proposi-
tion 22, an "initiative statute" limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. Perry v. Brown,
671 F.3d 1052, 1065 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5 (Deering 2012)). The
Supreme Court of California subsequently invalidated the new statute in In re Marriage
Cases but not before the state had issued over 18,000 marriage licenses to same-sex
couples. 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008) ("[W]e determine that the language of section 300
limiting the designation of marriage to a union between a man and a woman is unconstitu-
tional and must be stricken from the statute, and that the remaining statutory language
must be understood as making the designation of marriage available both to opposite-sex
and same-sex couples.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at
1067. In 2008, five California residents collected signatures to have the issue of same-sex
marriage placed on the ballot once again, as "Proposition 8," not an "initiative statute" but
rather the proposition for the ratification of a new state constitutional amendment. Perry
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012). Voters approved this new proposition
by a "slim majority." Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating
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ation in California, the Ninth Circuit's decision will most likely not reach
the U.S. Supreme Court.3 6
Another aspect of the fight for marriage equality concerns the recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages at the federal level." In May 2012, the First
Circuit affirmed a lower court decision finding unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds section three of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA)." The initial DOMA challenges were brought on equal pro-
tection, Tenth Amendment, and Spending Clause grounds." The plain-
tiffs' success throughout the litigation and appeal process further fueled
that Proposition 8 passed with 52.3 percent approval and that the resulting constitutional
amendment took effect on November 5, 2008). The Ninth Circuit ultimately invalidated
the new constitutional amendment in February 2012. Id. at 1096.
36. Maura Dolan & Carol J. Williams, Divided Court Rejects Proposition 8; 9th Cir-
cuit Panel Declares the State's Gay-Marriage Ban Unconstitutional, L.A. TIMFs, Feb. 8,
2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/08/local/la-me-prop8-20120208 (commenting that
the Ninth Circuit based its decision "on a 1996 U.S. Supreme Court precedent that said a
majority may not take away a minority's rights without legitimate reasons"). Retired Chief
Judge Vaughn Walker, the judge who presided over Perry at trial, has acknowledged that
the U.S. Supreme Court may decide to turn down this case because of its narrow holding.
See Scottie Thomaston, Prop 8: Former Chief Judge Walker Questions If Supreme Court
Would Review Challenge, PROP 8 TmAi, TRACKER (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.prop8trial-
tracker.com/2012/04/20/prop-8-former-chief-judge-walker-questions-if-supreme-court-
would-review-challenge ("Because of the narrow grounds the 9th Circuit ruled on, [the
U.S. Supreme Court] could turn down that case.").
37. Two code provisions enacted by the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 affect same-
sex marriages. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) ("In determining the meaning of any Act of Con-
gress . . . the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman
as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who
is a husband or a wife.") and 28 U.S.C. § 1738(C) (2006) ("No State. .. shall be required to
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory,
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State . . . ."); see also Defense of
Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, §§ 2(a), 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (limiting mar-
riage one man and one woman).
38. See Mass. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2012)
(finding DOMA unconstitutional on equal protection grounds). "These appeals present
constitutional challenges to section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act . . . which denies
federal economic and other benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in Massachusetts
and to surviving spouses from couples thus married." Id. See also 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)
(codifying the definitions from DOMA); Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199,
110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (defining marriage as between one man and one woman); U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Serv., 698 F. Supp. 2d at 253 (overturning DOMA on Tenth Amend-
ment grounds); David G. Savage, Federal Appeals Court Rules Defense of Marriage Act
Unconstitutional, L.A. TIMEs, May 31, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/31/news/
la-pn-doma-appeals-court-20120531.
39. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 682 F.3d at 7; see Gill v. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 397 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that DOMA violates Equal
Protection).
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political debates.4 0 Strong voices, including those of President Barack
Obama and Senator Dianne Feinstein, have called for Congress to repeal
DOMA.4 1 In fact, shortly before the First Circuit handed down its affir-
mation of the lower court holding, President Barack Obama officially ex-
pressed his support of same-sex marriage.42
This Note addresses a less frequently cited gay rights issue affecting
same-sex relationships-the interplay between the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and state laws governing issuance of supplemental birth certifi-
cates to out-of-state adoptive parents of the same sex.43 Courts have in-
terpreted the Full Faith and Credit Clause to require recognition of out-
of-state adoption decrees." State laws regulate their enforcement and
generally allow adoptive parents to receive a new birth certificate for a
child born in the forum state and adopted in a foreign jurisdiction."5 Such
40. See Kirk Johnson, Basis of Ruling on Gay Unions Stirs Debate, N.Y. Timiws, July 9,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/10/us/politics/lOtenth.html (commenting on "frac-
tures and fault lines among groups working to bolster states' rights.").
41. The most recent initiative, Senate Bill 598, proposed by Diane Feinstein, success-
fully passed the Senate Judiciary Committee on November 10, 2011. S. 598, 112th Cong.
(2011); see also Paul Guequierre, Senate Judiciary Committee Approves Bill Repealing Dis-
criminatory Defense of Marriage Act, HRC (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/
senate-judiciary-committee-approves-bill-repealing-doma (quoting President Barrack
Obama, "DOMA belongs with 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' in the history books."); see David
Nakamura, Obama Backs Bill to Repeal Defense of Marriage Act, WASH. POST, July 19,
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-backs-bill-to-repeal-defense-of-mar-
riage-act/2011/07/19/gIQAO3eQOI~story.html (announcing President Barrack Obama's
support). Notably, this was not the first attempt to repeal DOMA. See, e.g., H.R. 3567,
111th Cong. (2009) (introduction an earlier Respect for Marriage Act targeting the repeal
of DOMA).
42. The White House Blog (May 10, 2012, 7:31 p.m.), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
2012/05/1 0/obama-supports-same-sex-marriage.
43. Krista Stone-Manista, Parents in Illinois Are Parents in Oklahoma Too: An Argu-
ment for Mandatory Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Adoptions, 19 LAw & SLXUALIfY
137, 138 (2010).
44. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding "that final
adoption orders and decrees are judgments that are entitled to recognition by all other
states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.").
45. Id. at 1154 (stating that "[e]nforcement measures do not travel with the sister state
judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures remain subject to the even-handed con-
trol of forum law"); see, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 338-20(a) (LexisNexis 2008) (declar-
ing that "[iun case of the adoption of any person born in the State, the department of
health, upon receipt of a properly certified copy of the adoption decree, or certified ab-
stract thereof on a form approved by the department, shall prepare a supplementary certif-
icate"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-15-223 (2011) (stating that "[t]he department shall
establish a new certificate of birth for a person born in this state when the department
receives ... a certificate of adoption"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.10 (West 2007) (main-
taining that "[tihe State registrar shall, upon the request of a parent of any such child who
is adopted outside of this State or the United States or the request of any person on behalf
of such child, issue a new certificate of birth"); N.M. S-rAi'. ANN. § 24-14-17 (LexisNexis
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birth certificates then reflect the changes in parentage effectuated by the
out-of-state adoption decree.4 6 Most jurisdictions sanction same-sex par-
ent adoptions4 7 and thus also allow same-sex couples to obtain revised
birth certificates for their adoptive children.48 Yet, same-sex parents who
adopt out-of-state may struggle with receiving revised birth certificates in
the handful of states that prohibit gay and lesbian couples from jointly
adopting children.4 9
2007) (declaring that "Itihe state registrar shall establish a new certificate of birth for a
person born in this state when he receives . . . a report of adoption").
46. See Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1156 (holding "that final adoption orders and decrees
are judgments that are entitled to recognition by all other states under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause"); see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8-40.10 (West 2007) (stating that "[tlhe
State registrar shall . . . issue a new certificate of birth . . . showing . . . the names of the
adopting parents").
47. See, e.g., N.J. STAr. ANN. § 26:8-40.10 (West 2007) (stating that "[t]he State regis-
trar shall . . . issue a new certificate of birth . . . showing . . . the names of the adopting
parents").
48. Elizabeth Burleson, International Human Rights Law, Co-Parent Adoption, and
the Recognition of Gay and Lesbian Families, 55 Loy. L. R,.v. 791, 793 (2009); see also
HUMAN Riifris CAMPAIGN, PARENTING LAws: JOINT ADoPTIoN, MAPS o S. LAws &
Poiuici s, http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/Joint Adoption-parentingLaws-
April_2011.pdf (last updated Jan. 6,2012) (providing information of the state of joint adop-
tion laws around the United States); HUMAN Riorrs CAMPAIGN, PARENTING LAws: Siic-
OND-PARENT AoornoN, MAPS oiF Sr. LAWS & PoicmI-s 1 (2012), available at http://www.
hrc.org/files/images/general/2ndParentAdoption.pdf (providing information of the state
of second-parent adoption laws around the United States).
49. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 161 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that Louisiana
need not issue a supplemental birth certificate that reflects the names of both parents to an
unmarried same-sex couple). In Louisiana, only married couples can jointly adopt a child.
LA. Cu>. Coon ANN. art. 1221 (2004) (effective Jan. 1, 1992) ("A single person, eighteen
years or older, or a married couple jointly may petition to privately adopt a child."). Be-
cause the State prohibits same-sex marriages and does not recognize same-sex marriages
performed in other jurisdictions, it has in effect banned same-sex couples from jointly
adopting children. See LA. CONsT. art. 12, § 15 ("No official or court of the state of Louisi-
ana shall recognize any marriage contracted in any other jurisdiction which is not the union
of one man and one woman."); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (1999) ("Persons of the same
sex may not contract marriage with each other."); LA. Civ. CoDE ANN. art. 3520 (2011)
("A purported marriage between persons of the same sex violates a strong public policy of
the state of Louisiana and such a marriage contracted in another state shall not be recog-
nized in this state for any purpose, including the assertion of any right or claim as a result
of the purported marriage."). Utah, in addition to banning unmarried couples from joint
adoptions, prohibits adoption by a single individual "cohabiting in a relationship that is not
a legally valid and binding marriage." UlAti CoDn ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (LexisNexis
2008); see also Jason N.W. Plowman, When Second-Parent Adoption is the Second-Best
Option: The Case for Legislative Reform as the Next Best Option for Same-Sex Couples in
the Fact of Continued Marriage Inequality, 11 SCHOLAR 57, 67 (detailing statutes prohibit-
ing second-parent adoptions).
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Two circuit level decisions stand as an archetype of such conflicting
treatment-Finstuen v. Crutcherso and Adar v. Smith." In both cases,
same-sex couples jointly adopted in a state other than the child's state of
birth." Each couple then petitioned to receive a revised birth certificate
reflecting the newly created parental status." Following initial denials,
the couples brought suit.5 4 In the end, the Tenth Circuit in Finstuen held
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required Oklahoma to recognize the
out-of-state adoption decree and state law mandated the State Registrar
to issue a revised birth certificate.55 In Adar, the Fifth Circuit also held
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause mandated recognition of the paren-
tal relationship created by the out-of-state adoption decree.5 ' Unlike the
Tenth Circuit, however, it concluded that Louisiana law did not command
the Registrar to issue a supplemental birth certificate listing both same-
sex parents.5 7 Surprisingly, closer inspection reveals that the Oklahoma
and Louisiana statutes implicated in Finstuen and Adar are practically the
same.
This Note posits that the Fifth Circuit in Adar misinterpreted Louisiana
law and incorrectly concluded the state's statutes prohibited issuance of a
revised birth certificate to the plaintiffs. The Note proceeds in four parts.
First, it surveys the history and current state of the law regarding same-
sex parent adoptions. It then charts the role of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause in recognition and enforcement of out-of-state judgments and pro-
vides a summary of the Tenth and Fifth Circuits' decisions and the respec-
tive state statutes behind those holdings. The following section compares
the state statutes implicated in Finstuen and Adar and asks whether the
latter erroneously concluded that Louisiana law did not require issuance
of a revised birth certificate. This Note concludes that in its quest to dis-
tinguish Finstuen, Adar misinterpreted established law and incorrectly
concluded that "Louisiana does not permit any unmarried couples-
whether adoption [occurred] out-of-state or in-state[-Ito obtain revised
birth certificates with both parents' names on them."58
50. See Crutcher , 496 F.3d at 1142.
51. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). See also Jason N.W.
Plowman, When Second-Parent Adoption is the Second-Best Option: The Case for Legisla-
tive Reform as the Next Best Option for Same-Sex Couples in the Fact of Continued Mar-
riage Inequality, 11 SCIOL AR 57, 67-68 (detailing judicial decisions permitting second-
parent adoptions).
52. Adar, 639 F.3d at 149; Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1142.
53. Adar, 639 F.3d at 149; Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1142.
54. Adar, 639 F.3d at 149-50; Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1142.
55. Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1156.
56. Adar, 639 F.3d at 159.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 161.
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II. THE HisTORY AND LAWS SURROUNDING SAME-SEX
PARENT ADOPTION
The "gayby boom""5 is now in its third decade.60 More and more
same-sex couples beget children by artificial insemination, surrogacy, and
adoption." A number of legal issues surround each of the listed meth-
ods.6 In debating the conflicting treatment of adoptive same-sex parents
59. See Scott Harris, 2 Moms or 2 Dads-and a Baby: Gay Parents Give Birth to
Families of Their Own, Thanks to Such Methods as Artificial Insemination and Adoption,
L.A. Timirs, Oct. 20, 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-10-20/news/mn-470_1_artificial-
insemination (depicting the "gayby boom" as "Children . .. added to gay households in a
variety of ways: by winning custody of offspring in the dissolution of heterosexual mar-
riages, by adoption, by alternative means of conception"). The term "gayby boom" can be
traced back to a 1990 Newsweek article titled "The Future of Gay America." See Eloise
Salholz et al., The Future of Gay America, GAYLIB (Mar. 12, 1990), http://www.gaylib.com/
text/rept6.htm ("[A] new generation of gay parents has produced the first-ever 'gayby
boom."').
60. See Harris, supra note 59 (depicting the "gayby boom" as "Children. . . added to
gay households in a variety of ways: by winning custody of offspring in the dissolution of
heterosexual marriages, by adoption, by alternative means of conception."); see also Eloise
Salholz et al., The Future of Gay America, GAYLim (Mar. 12, 1990), http://www.gaylib.com/
text/rept6.htm (using the phrase "gayby boom" to describe the growing movement for
same-sex partners to become parents). For years scholars have used the term "gayby
boom" in academic writing. See Otis R. Damslet, Same-Sex Marriage, 10 N.Y.L. Scai. J.
Hum. Rrs. 555, 562 (1993) ("[C]ontemporary American culture has begun to include a
renaissance of Gay parenting...."); Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One
Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BueIi. L.
Riev. 341, 342 (2002) (stating that by 2002 approximately ten million children had same-sex
parents); Tiffany L. Palmer, The Winding Road to the Two Dad Family: Issues Arising in
Interstate Surrogacy for Gay Couples, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. Pot'v 895, 896 (2011) (argu-
ing that the "gayby boom" has exploded in the last twenty years); Kimberly Richman,
Lovers, Legal Strangers, and Parents: Negotiating Parental and Sexual Identity in Family
Law, 36 LAw & Soc'y REv. 285, 287 (2002) (indicating that courts are increasingly "being
forced to deal with the intersection of sexuality and family law").
61. See Gary J. Gates, Family Formation and Raising Children Among Same Sex
Couples, NAT'L CouNCIL ON FAM. RE L., at Fl, F2-F3 (2011), available at http://williamsin-
stitute.law.ucia.edulwp-content/uploads/Gates-Badgett-NCFR-LGBT-Families-December-
2011.pdf (showing an increase in gay and lesbian child rearing through 2006); Catherine
DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted Reproductive Technolo-
gies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 147
(2000) (noting that growing numbers of same-sex couples are having children through as-
sisted reproductive technologies); Kyle C. Velte, Egging on Lesbian Maternity: The Legal
Implications of Tri-Gametic in Vitro Fertilization, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. Pot'Y & L.
431, 436 (1999) (stating that a growing number of unmarried couples, including same-sex
couples, have been using assisted reproductive technologies to build families).
62. See Harvey L. Fiser & Paula K. Garrett, It Takes Three, Baby: The Lack of Stan-
dard, Legal Definitions of "Best Interest of the Child" and the Right to Contract for Lesbian
Potential Parents, 15 CARDoo J.L. & GENDER 1, 1 (2008) (discussing legal issues sur-
rounding artificial insemination); see also Austin Caster, Don't Split the Baby: How the U.S.
Could Avoid Uncertainty and Unnecessary Litigation and Promote Equality by Emulating
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with respect to the issuance of supplemental birth certificates, it is impor-
tant to understand the laws surrounding adoption. This section briefly
portrays the history behind same-sex parent adoptions and charts the
state of the law with respect to joint 3 and second parent64 adoptions by
gay and lesbian couples.
A. History of Same-Sex Parent Adoption"s
Adoption was not practiced at common law." Rather, it is a statutory
privilege." Modern adoption, which focuses on the provision of a family
for a child and only secondarily on an adult's desire to obtain an heir,
dates back to 1851 when Massachusetts passed the first adoption law fo-
cused on children's welfare." While the Massachusetts law did not spe-
cifically prohibit same-sex parent adoption, the time was not ripe to test
the wording of the statute.6 9 Given that the American Psychiatric Associ-
ation kept homosexuality in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders until 197370 and that until 1962 each state had criminal
the British Surrogacy Law Regime, 10 CONN. Pun. INT. L.J. 477, 479 (2011) (discussing
legal issues surrounding surrogacy agreements).
63. Joint adoption refers to adoption by two adoptive parents at one time. See discus-
sion infra Part 11.B.1.
64. Second-parent adoption allows a person to become a co-parent with someone who
already holds legal parent status. See discussion infra Part 11.B.2.
65. Some sources use the term "lesbigay adoption." See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, A
Critical Analysis of Interstate Recognition of Lesbigay Adoptions, 3 AVE MARIA L. Rev.
561, 561 (2005) (defining "lesbigay adoption" as "adoption of a child or children by a
person or persons involved in a lesbian or gay relationship").
66. Martin R. Gardner, Adoptions by Homosexuals in the Wake of Lawrence v. Texas,
6 J. L. & FAM. STuD. 19, 22-23 (2004) (noting that adoption "did not exist at common
law"); Vanessa A. Lavely, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Reconciling the
Differences Between Marriage and Adoption Cases, 55 UCLA L. REV. 247, 263 (2007) ("At
common law, adoption did not exist . . . .").
67. See Vanessa A. Lavely, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Recon-
ciling the Differences Between Marriage and Adoption Cases, 55 UCLA L. REV. 247, 263
(2007) (finding that adoption is a "statutory privilege, rather than a right").
68. See Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Interstate Recognition of Lesbigay
Adoptions, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 561, 564 (2005). Contra Amanda C. Pustilnik, Private
Ordering, Legal Ordering, and the Getting of Children: A Counterhistory of Adoption Law,
20 YALE L. & Poi'Y REV. 263, 264 (2002) (presenting an alternative view claiming that
adoption is "nonstatutory, with deep private-ordering roots in contract law").
69. See Massachusetts Adoption of Children Act, 1851, TiE ADoIrIoN HISTORY PRo-
mEcr, http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/-adoption/archive/MassACA.htm (last updated Feb. 24,
2012) (outlining the requirements for adoption in Massachusetts in 1851).
70. When Homosexuality Was Mental Illness, DAILY Kos (Apr. 26, 2011, 2:36 PM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/04/26/970357/-When-homosexuality-was-mental-illness
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sodomy laws on the books," this adoption model, which was intended to
imitate traditional family relationships for children, obviously precluded
adoptions by same-sex couples. 72
The issue of same-sex parent adoption first arose in the 1970s." Dur-
ing that time, however, judges were unsympathetic to the idea of parent-
ing by gays and lesbians and there is no record of an adoption by an
openly homosexual person during the 1970s." With judges pondering the
topic, the state legislatures also joined the debate. In 1977 Florida
stripped the eligibility to adopt from any person, "if that person [was] a
homosexual."'7  New Hampshire followed suit in 1986 with a similar
ban.7 6
71. Carlos Maza, State Sodomy Laws Continue to Target LGBT Americans, EcuAL-
rry MATI-ERS (Aug. 8, 2011, 3:26 PM), http://equalitymatters.org/blog/201108080012.
72. See Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. Rav.
1025, 1043 n.66 (2002) (noting that in 1973 the Association voted to exclude homosexuality
as a recognized disorder); N.H. REV. STAr. ANN. § 170-B:4 (2010) (specifying that a mar-
ried couple includes a husband and wife) (repealed in part in 1999); see also Jeffrey M.
Goldman, Protecting Gays From the Government's Crosshairs: A Reevaluation of the Ninth
Circuit's Treatment of Gays Under the Federal Constitution's Equal Protection Clause Fol-
lowing Lawrence v. Texas, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 617, 625 n.38 (2005) (indicating that Illinois
was the first state to decriminalize consensual sodomy in 1962); Wardle, supra note 68
("[T]he heart of this child-centered model of adoption was the creation of family relation-
ships that imitated and were intended to replicate the relationship that exists between par-
ents and child(ren) in a birth (natural) family."). On the other hand, perhaps surprisingly,
single parent adoptions have been legal since the birth of modern adoption. Massachusetts
Adoption of Children Act, 1851, TiHE AroonoN His-rov Pi~oisicr, http://darkw-
ing.uoregon.edu/-adoption/archive/MassACA.htm (last updated Feb. 24, 2012) ("Any in-
habitant of this Commonwealth may petition the judge of probate, in the county wherein
he or she may reside, for leave to adopt a child not his or her own by birth."). Openly
homosexual individuals, however, were rarely able to adopt even very recently. See, e.g.,
FLA. STATr. ANN. § 63.042 (2012), held unconstitutional by Fla. Dep't of Children and Fami-
lies v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So.3d 79, 79 (2010); Miss. Comir- ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (2004)
("Adoption by couples of the same gender is prohibited."); UTAH CoDE, ANN. § 78B-6-
117(3) (2008) ("A child may not be adopted by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship
that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state."). Neverthe-
less, because single parent adoption is not an issue raised by Adar v. Smith or Finstuen v.
Crutcher, it is outside of the scope of this comment. This comment concerns joint and
second-parent adoptions. The two types of adoption above are the potential source of
conflict in light of the apparent conflict created by Adar and Finstuen.
73. Lavely, supra note 67, at 264.
74. Id.
75. FLA. STi-A'T. ANN. § 63.042 (2012), held unconstitutional by Fla. Dep't of Children
and Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So.3d 79, 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
76. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:4 (2010) (amended in 1999) (omitting any lan-
guage providing for adoption by same-sex couples).
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Gradual liberalization in the 1990s brought change and same-sex par-
ent adoptions began to take place in the United States. 7 Yet, even today
exact statistics on same-sex parenting are difficult to obtain. In 2005,
data suggested that as many as 317,000 children were being raised by
same-sex couples." Now, in the third decade of the "gayby boom," some
sources speak of a decreasing trend in the number of lesbian, gay, and
bisexual parents raising a child. The National Council on Family Rela-
tions suggests that this trend may be caused by a decrease in the number
of biological children born to lesbian, gay, and bisexual parents engaged
in opposite sex relationships at an early age, perhaps because of increased
acceptance of homosexuality and decreasing need to put on a fagade of
heterosexuality."
In any event, with television series such as Modern Family,8 2 same-sex
couple parenting has become more visible to mainstream society." Simi-
larly, while the numbers of biological children born to lesbian, gay, and
bisexual parents may be decreasing, same-sex parent adoptions are in-
creasingly more common in the United States.84 According to the 2000
Census, nearly 10% of same-sex unmarried couples were raising an
adopted child." Research suggests that this number nearly doubled to
77. Lavely, supra note 67, at 265-66; see In re Petition of L.S., No. A-29-90, 1991 WL
219598 at *4 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 1991) (granting second-parent adoption to a lesbian
couple); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 862 (D.C. 1995) (granting second-parent adoption to
a gay couple); In re Petition of K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that
state law did not prohibit second-parent adoption by same-sex couples); Adoption of
Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) (granting joint adoption to a lesbian couple); In
re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995) (granting second-parent adoptions to lesbian
couples); In re Adoptions of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (granting second-parent
adoption to a lesbian couple and noting that it was not an issue of first impression in
Vermont).
78. Susan Donaldson James, Census 2010: One-Quarter of Gay Couples Raising Chil-
dren, ABC Ne~ws, Jun. 23, 2011, at 1, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/sex-couples-census-
data-trickles-quarter-raising-children/story?id=13850332#.T3EXyE9xVhk (stating that it
was not until the 2010 Census that the Census Bureau began counting same-sex couples
and their children).
79. See Wardle, supra note 68, at 561-62 (stating that the 2010 Census suggests that
today there are over 110,000 same-sex couples raising children).
80. Gates, supra note 61, at Fl, F2.
81. Id.
82. How T V. Brought Gay People into Our Lives Homes, NAT'L Punuic RAulo (May
12, 2012) (downloaded using npr.org), available at http://www.npr.org/2012/05/12/1525787
40/how-tv-brought-gay-people-into-our-homes.
83. Gates, supra note 61, at Fl, F2.
84. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 68 (saying that "lesbigay" adoption is increasingly
accepted in the United States).
85. See Gates, supra note 61, at Fl, F2 (showing an increase in gay and lesbian child
rearing).
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19% by 2009.8 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
reported surveys suggesting that two million lesbian, gay, and bisexual
individuals expressed an interest in adopting a child." The data shows
that a true "gayby boom" is still coming. Nevertheless, a number of ob-
stacles stand in the way of same-sex parents wanting to adopt a child.
First, adoption agencies may utilize a hierarchy of placement that treats
same-sex couples as families of last resort." While state agencies may be
unable to prioritize in a similar fashion because of existing laws, private
organizations (particularly private religious organizations) are not con-
strained by the same laws as state actors.89 Second, even though same-
sex couples may legally adopt in the vast majority of the states, many
lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals still believe they are legally barred
from adopting. 0 Third, while in one way or another most states would
allow a child to be raised by a same-sex couple, in a number of instances
the law stands as an obstacle to joint and second parent adoptions."1 The
86. Id.; Sabrina Tavernise, Adoptions by Gay Couples Rise, Despite Barriers, N.Y.
TIMIZs, June 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/us/14adoption.html?-r=1
("About [19%] of same-sex couples raising children reported having an adopted child in
the house in 2009, up from just 8 [%] in 2000.").
87. U.S. Dipr oiF HEALfiH AND HUMAN SEIv., WORKING WITH LHSHIAN, GAY, Bi-
SEXUAL, AND TRANSGHNDER (LGBT) FAMILIES IN ADorn-oN 5 (2011), available at
www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/fjprofbulletin/f projbulletin.pdf
88. Id. at 7.
89. Id.; see Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights v. City and Cnty. of San
Francisco, 464 F. Supp. 2d 938, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that a municipal resolution
opposing a Vatican directive that the Catholic archdiocese stop placing children in homo-
sexual households did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment). At
least two states expressly sanction discrimination toward homosexuals by private adoption
organizations. See N.D. CENT. Coon ANN. § 50-12-07.1 (West, Westlaw through the 2011
Regular and Special Sessions of the 62nd Legislative Assembly) ("A child-placing agency
is not required to perform, assist, counsel, recommend, facilitate, refer, or participate in a
placement that violates the agency's written religious or moral convictions or policies.");
H.189, Reg. Sess. (VA 2012) ("[N]o private child-placing agency shall be required to per-
form, assist, counsel, recommend, consent to, refer, or participate in any placement of a
child for foster care or adoption when the proposed placement would violate the agency's
written religious or moral convictions or policies."); Trudy Ring, Va. OK's Discrimination
in Adoption Services, ADvocATnE (Feb. 22, 2012, 9:30PM), http://www.advocate.com/news/
daily-news/2012/02/22/va-oks-discrimination-adoption-services (discussing Oklahoma's le-
galized discrimination against same-sex adoptive parents).
90. See U.S. DiPrT OF HEAIFM AND HUMAN SERV., supra note 87, at 8 (expressing
that this misconception often serves as a barrier for same-sex parents).
91. See id. (recognizing that "[i]n states that do not permit second-parent adoptions by
LGBT families, adopted children are denied equal protection under the law."); see also
Gardner, supra note 66, at 23 (noting that adoption "did not exist at common law"); NAT'L
OTR. FOR LESBIAN RioTrrs, ArnorioN av LEsBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUALS PARmrrs: AN
OvERVIEw OF CURRENT LAw 4 (2012), available at http://www.google.com/url?q=Http://
www.ndlrights.org/site/DocServer/adptn0204.pdf%3FdoclD%3D1221&sa=U&ei=i853T-
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following section addresses precisely the last point and charts the current
state of the law with regard to joint and second parent adoptions by
same-sex couples in all fifty states.
B. State of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Parent Adoption
There are a number of ways in which same-sex couples can parent a
child through adoption. Individual adoption is always an option for un-
married individuals regardless of sexual orientation.9 2 However, whether
it be for sociological or merely economic and practical reasons, having
two parents is beneficial for the parents and the child alike. Joint" and
second parent 94 adoptions describe the legal process for creating such re-
lationships between same-sex couples and adoptive children. According
to the National Center for Lesbian Rights:
Second-parent and joint adoptions protect children in same-sex par-
ent families by giving the child the legal security of having two legal
parents, entitling them to crucial financial benefits, including inheri-
tance rights, wrongful death and other tort damages, Social Security
benefits, and child support. In many situations, second-parent adop-
tions are important to ensure health insurance coverage for the child
and to allow both parents to make medical decisions for the child.
Moreover, second parent and joint adoptions foster children's emo-
bFBtT1gAfaorDZDg&ved=0CAQQFjAA&client=internal-uds-cse&usg=AFQjCNGYCw
ZK8z_88SgQ7KqXniZ-sVak9g (encouraging courts to forego a strict interpretation of
adoption statues in order to further the underlying goal of promoting the best interests of
the child).
92. NAT'L 0TR. FOR LESBIAN Ricirrs, ADoInoN BY LESBIAN, GAY, AND BIsE-XUALS
PARENTS: AN OvERviEw OF CURRENT LAw 2 (2012), available at http://www.google.com/
url?q=http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/adptnO204.pdf%3FdoclD%3D1221&sa=
U&ei=i853T-bFBtTIgAfaorDZDg&ved=OCAQQFjAA&client=internal-uds-cse&usg=AF
QjCNGYCwZK8z_88SgQ7KqXniZ-sVak9g (claiming that most states theoretically allow
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals to adopt). The caveat to this statement
comes in the form of Utah's adoption law. UTAII CorDE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (LexisNexis
2008) (stating that "[a] child may not be adopted by a person who is cohabiting in a rela-
tionship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state.").
Moreover, until 2010 Florida expressly prohibited adoptions by anyone "if that person
[was] a homosexual." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 2005); Fla. Dep't of Children and
Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So.3d 79, 99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding the
categorical ban of Florida Statute § 63.042(3) unconstitutional).
93. See HUMAN Rioires CAMPAIGN, PARENTING LAWS: JOINT ADOInON 1 (2011),
available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/parenting_1aws-maps.pdf (defining a
joint adoption as "adopting a child from the child's biological parent(s) or adopting a child
who is in the custody of the state.").
94. See NAT'L CR. FOR LiESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 92 (classifying a second-parent
adoption as an adoption that allows a partner of the same sex to adopt a partner's adoptive
or biological child).
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tional and developmental health by recognizing the children's actual
relationship to both adults in such families. Second-parent adoptions
also protect the rights of the same sex second parent, by ensuring
that he or she will continue to have a legally recognized parental
relationship to the child if the couple separates or if the biological
(or original adoptive) parent dies or becomes incapacitated or
incarcerated.
Unfortunately for same-sex couples, the laws governing joint and sec-
ond parent adoption are not always clear.96 The following sections
briefly describe the state of the law with respect to joint and second par-
ent adoptions in the United States.
1. Joint Adoption
Joint adoption with specific reference to same-sex couples is under-
stood to be "a couple adopting a child from the child's biological par-
ent(s) or adopting a child who is in the custody of the state."" The rights
of the state or the biological parents terminate with joint adoption.98 This
type of adoption stands in contrast to second parent or stepparent adop-
tions, which do not terminate the rights of the previously recognized bio-
logical or adoptive parent, but instead allow a co-parent to gain shared
parental rights.99
For same-sex couples seeking to adopt jointly, marriage is generally the
most burdensome requirement imposed by state law. 00 By the same to-
ken, the states that permit same-sex marriage also permit same-sex mar-
95. Id.
96. See HUMAN RIirrs CAMPAIGN, supra note 93, at 1; Timothy E. Lin, Social Norms
and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining the Role of Narratives in Same-Sex Adoption
Cases, 99 CoituM. L. RiEv. 739, 766 (1999) (noting that the courts are left to decide if same-
sex couples are eligible to adopt due to ambiguous language in statutes and unclear legisla-
tive intent); Devjani Mishra, The Road to Concord: Resolving the Conflict of Law Over
Adoption by Gays and Lesbians, 30 Cosum. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 91,102-04 (1996) (finding
that state adoption statutes are often confusing and incoherent).
97. HUMAN Rion-ts CAMPAIGN, supra note 93, at 1.
98. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Adoption of Child by Same-Sex Partners, 61
A.L.R. F-o. 6 (2011) (describing the laws of New York in relation to second-parent
adoption).
99. See id. (indicating that some second-parent and stepparent adoptions can be used
to prevent the automatic termination of the biological parent's rights when a same-sex
partner adopts).
100. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (West 2011) ("A child may not be adopted
by a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding mar-
riage under the laws of this state.").
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ried couples to jointly adopt.o' In addition to the District of Columbia
and the nine states that allow same-sex marriages, eight states-Arkan-
sas,102 California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey, and
Oregon-permit joint adoptions by unmarried same-sex couples state-
wide. 03
Only Mississippi expressly targets homosexuals and prohibits
"[a]doption by couples of the same gender."'" In some jurisdictions,
such as Louisiana, the law does not on its face prohibit joint same-sex
parent adoptions but does so in effect. Specifically, Louisiana law states
that "[a] single person . . . or a married couple jointly may petition to
privately adopt a child."' While the text does not expressly prohibit
unmarried couples from jointly adopting, the state's Attorney General
has opined otherwise.' This interpretation of Louisiana law, taken in
conjunction with Louisiana's constitutional prohibition against recogni-
tion of out-of-state same-sex marriages,' 0 7 creates a de facto prohibition
of same-sex couple adoptions.' Utah law has a similar effect as it does
101. See Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws,
supra note 30 (reporting that the District of Columbia, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington have passed legislation
allowing for same-sex marriage); Alana Semuels, Voters OK Gay Marriage in Maine, Ma-
ryland, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-
gay-marriage-20121107,0,1194693.story.
102. See Ark. Dep't of Human Serv. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at *24-26 (2011) (over-
turning the Arkansas Adoption and Foster Care Act of 2008 prohibiting unmarried couples
from adopting children).
103. See HuMAN RIGCTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 93, at 1; Adoption, ALTERNATIVE7S
TO MARRIA6oe PROJEcr, http://www.unmarried.org/adoption.html (last visited Oct. 6,
2012) (listing California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Vermont, and the District of Columbia as jurisdictions that allow unmarried
couples to adopt jointly).
104. Miss. CooE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2011) ("Adoption by couples of the same gender
is prohibited.").
105. LA. CHIHD. CODE ANN. art. 1221 (2004) (asserting that "[a) single person, eigh-
teen years or older, or a married couple jointly may petition to privately adopt a child").
106. Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2010), rev'd en banc, 639 F.3d 146 (5th
Cir. 2011).
107. See LA. CONsT. art. 12, § 15 ("No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall
recognize any marriage contracted in any other jurisdiction which is not the union of one
man and one woman.").
108. See Steve Sanders, Interstate Recognition of Parent-Child Relationships: The Lim-
its of the State Interests Paradigm and the Role of Due Process, U. Ciii. LEGAL F. 233, 249
(2011) (explaining that "in the absence of some right protected by the Constitution or
other federal law, a state court is bound to apply its own statutory law or an interpretation
thereof").
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not allow "a person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally
valid and binding marriage under the laws of [the) state" to adopt. 09
In many states, the law regarding joint same-sex parent adoptions is
unclear because it does not expressly address the issue. Consequently,
where the law neither expressly permits nor prohibits same-sex couples
from jointly adopting, desiring couples can petition judges for adoptions
and argue for joint adoptions on a case-by-case basis."io The Human
Rights Campaign lists Minnesota as the only state where same-sex
couples have successfully petitioned to jointly adopt in some jurisdic-
tions."' However, even when joint adoption is not an option supported
by the law, some same-sex couples may be able to adopt a child through
second parent adoption.
2. Second Parent Adoption
In the 1980s, lawyers and academics working on issues of same-sex
parenting began using the term "second parent adoption" as a "natural
extension" of stepparent adoption."' This type of adoption, also referred
to as co-parent adoption,' 13 allows a second person of the same sex to
gain co-parent rights through adoption without terminating the parental
109. UrAI CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (West 2011); UTrAn CONs-r. art. 1, § 29 (Lexis-
Nexis 2012) ("Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman.").
110. See HUMAN Rimrrs CAMPAIGN, supra note 93, at 1; Timothy E. Lin, Social
Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining the Role of Narratives in Same-Sex Adop-
tion Cases, 99 Coi.uM. L. Riy. 739, 766-77 (1999) (discussing the courts' role in shaping
social norms).
111. See HUMAN Rians CAMPAIGN, supra note 93, at 1; Defining Marriage: Defense
of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, supra note 30; see also Christian Eichen-
laub, "Minnesota Nice": A Comparative Analysis of Minnesota's Treatment of Adoption by
Gay Couples, 5 U. S-r. ThOMAs L.J. 312 (2008) (providing a detailed analysis of Minne-
sota's stance on same-sex parent adoptions).
112. See Elizabeth Zuckerman, Second-parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented Fami-
lies: Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. Rev. 729,731 n.8,733 (1986)
(arguing that second-parent adoptions would allow a biological parent's partner to adopt a
child without affecting the rights of the natural parent); Lavely, supra note 67 (arguing that
in the 1990s "courts and legislatures became increasingly receptive to the idea of same-sex
couples as parents [and] [l]awyers working on behalf of the same-sex couples 'coined the
term 'second-parent adoption' to describe the same-sex equivalent of a stepparent adop-
tion"'); Mark A. Momjian, Causes of Action for Second-Parent Adoption, in 25 CAUS'S OF
AcnON 21) § 1, at 7 (2004) (giving credit for coining the term "second-parent adoption" to
the National Center for Lesbian Rights); see also Overview, NAr'L Cr-. FOR LESBIAN
R-rs., http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issue-familiesoverview (last
visited Oct. 6, 2012) ("We were among the first to pioneer the concept of second-parent
adoption and since then, we've worked to protect our families one state at a time.").
113. NAT'L Cr. FOR LeSIAN Res., supra note 92.
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rights of the single (biological or adoptive) parent.1 4 Given the contin-
ued unavailability of same-sex marriage in most states (and hence un-
availability of stepparent adoption), second parent adoptions are a way to
"provide the child with two legal parents."" 5
Currently, eleven states and Washington, D.C., expressly permit sec-
ond-parent adoptions either by statute or court rulings and Colorado,
Connecticut, and Vermont permit second parent adoptions by statute." 6
114. Jason C. Beekman, Same-Sex Second-Parent Adoption and Intestacy Law: Apply-
ing the Sharon S. Model of "Simultaneous" Adoption to Parent-Child Provisions of the
Uniform Probate Code, 96 CORNEt L. REV. 139, 141-42 (2010).
In retrospect, "under present law, if A and B are unmarried, B and the child have no
legal relationship. Although the adults planned to coparent, A is legally a single par-
ent. B, the mother's partner, has no enforceable rights or responsibilities to the child.
Conversely, the child is denied the legal and financial benefits of a second parent."
Id.
115. Zuckerman, supra 112, at 731; see also Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage
Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, supra note 30.
116. See CAL. FAM. CooE § 9000(g) (West 2011) ("[S]tepparent adoption includes
adoption by a domestic partner . . . ."); Cot-o. REV. STAT. § 19-5-203(1)(d.5)(II) (2011) (
"In a petition for a second-parent adoption, the court shall require a written home study
report prepared by a county department of social services. . .. ") (emphasis added); CoLo.
REv. STAT. § 19-5-208(5) (2011) ("In all stepparent, second parent, custodial, and kinship
adoptions, the petition shall contain a statement informing the court whether the prospec-
tive adoptive parent was convicted . . . of a felony or misdemeanor . . . .") (emphasis
added); Coo. REV. STAT. § 19-5-210(1.5) (2011) ( "Except in stepparent, second parent,
custodial, or kinship adoptions, the court shall issue a certificate of approval of place-
ment . ... ") (emphasis added); CON. GEN. STAT. § 45a-724(a)(3) (2011) ([Any parent of a
minor child may agree in writing with one other person who shares parental responsibility
for the child with such parent that the other person shall adopt or join in the adoption of
the child . . . ."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1-102(b) (2011) ("If a family unit consists of a
parent and the parent's partner, and adoption is in the best interest of the child, the partner
of a parent may adopt a child of the parent."); Sharon S. v. Super. Ct. of San Diego Cnty.,
73 P.3d 554, 570, 568-69 (Cal. 2003) (holding second-parent adoptions valid under the
independent adoption laws); In re Petition of K.M., 274 Ill. App. 3d 189, 205 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995) (holding that unmarried same-sex cohabitants have standing to petition for adop-
tion); In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that
Indiana common law permits second-parent adoption); Adoption of M.A., 930 A.2d 1088,
1093 (Me. 2007) (recognizing that Maine law allows second-parent adoption); Adoption of
Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) (finding the availability of second-parent adop-
tion under Massachusetts law); In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535,
539 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (recognizing availability of second-parent adoptions in
New Jersey); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 401 (N.Y. 1995) (finding that New York law did
not prohibit second-parent adoption); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1201 (Pa.
2002) (upholding that same-sex couples could petition to adopt in a second-parent adop-
tion); In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993) (recognizing availability
of second-parent adoption under Vermont law); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 862 (D.C.
1995) (holding that "unmarried couples living together in a committed personal relation-
ship, whether of the same sex or of opposite sexes, are eligible to 'petition the court for a
decree of adoption"'). Per statute, Washington, D.C., also allows for stepparent and do-
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Appellate courts in California,'" Illinois,"' Indiana,"' Maine,12 0 Massa-
chusetts,' 2 ' New Jersey, 2 2 New York,12 3 Pennsylvania, 2 4 Vermont,12 5
and the District of Columbial 26 have found no legal bar to second-parent
adoptions. A number of lower level courts in various jurisdictions have
also permitted second parent adoptions." 7 According to the National
Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR), courts in some counties of Alabama,
Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mex-
ico, Texas, and West Virginia have all granted second parent adoptions to
same-sex couples.12 8 Because of the difficulty in gathering data from all
county courts in the country, the NCLR predicts that there are "undoubt-
edly others."' 2 9
mestic partner adoptions. See also D.C. CODE § 16-308(2) (2011) (explaining "[t]he court
may dispense with the investigation, report, and interlocutory decree provided for by this
chapter when . . . [t]he petitioner is a spouse or domestic partner of the natural parent of
the prospective adoptee and the natural parents consents to the adoption or joins in the
petition for adoption").
117. See Sharon S. v. Super. Ct. of San Diego Cnty., 73 P.3d 554, 570, 568-69 (Cal.
2003) (holding second-parent adoptions valid under the independent adoption laws); CAL.
FAM. Coon, § 9000(g) (2011) (including domestic partners in second-parent adoptions).
118. See In re Petition of K.M., 274 III. App. 3d 189, 205 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (finding
that unmarried same-sex cohabitants have standing to petition for adoption).
119. See In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (as-
serting that Indiana common law permits second-parent adoption).
120. See Adoption of M.A., 930 A.2d 1088, 1093 (Me. 2007) (recognizing that Maine
law allows second-parent adoption).
121. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) (finding the availabil-
ity of second-parent adoption under Massachusetts law).
122. See In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 539 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995) (stating that second-parent adoption is available in New Jersey).
123. See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 401 (N.Y. 1995) (finding that New York law did
not prohibit second-parent adoption).
124. See In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1201-02 (Pa. 2002) (holding that
same-sex couples could petition to adopt in a second-parent adoption).
125. See Adoption of B.L.V.13, 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993) (recognizing availabil-
ity of second-parent adoption under Vermont law).
126. See In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 862 (D.C. 1995) (holding that "unmarried
couples living together in a committed personal relationship, whether of the same sex or of
opposite sexes, are eligible to 'petition the court for a decree of adoption'"). Per statute,
Washington, D.C., also allows for stepparent and domestic partner adoptions. D.C. Coo)
§ 16-308(a)(2) (Lexis 2001 & Supp. 2012) ("The court may dispense with the investigation,
report, and interlocutory decree provided for by this chapter when ... [t]he petitioner is a
spouse or domestic partner of the natural parent of the prospective adoptee and the natu-
ral parents consents to the adoption or joins in the petition for adoption.").
127. See NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN R-rs., supra note 92 (providing examples of cases
and statutes allowing second-parent adoptions).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Like joint adoptions, a number of states have statutes and judicial deci-
sions that either directly or indirectly limit same-sex couples from pursu-
ing second-parent adoptions.13 0 A Mississippi statute expressly prohibits
same-sex couples from adopting a child.'31 Some states limit adoptions to
married couples and at the same time proscribe same-sex couples from
marrying in the state, effectively barring homosexual couples from sec-
ond-parent adoptions.'3 2 Appellate courts in Kentucky,13 3 Nebraska, 3 4
North Carolina,' 3 1 Ohio,"' and Wisconsin' 37 have declined to recognize
second parent adoptions. For the most part, these courts interpret the
states' statutes to mean that an adoption by a second parent of the same
sex would necessarily terminate the parental rights of the initial biological
or adoptive parent.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas and a Florida appellate court recently
held that exclusion of same-sex couples from child adoption violated the
respective states' constitutions." The disparities between the laws of the
fifty states raise questions regarding same-sex adoptive parents' rights
and privileges in states that do not permit gay and lesbian couples to
adopt either jointly or through second parent adoption."' The following
130. Id.
131. See Miss. Con7 ANN. § 93-17-3 (2011) (asserting that "[a]doption by couples of
the same gender is prohibited").
132. See U rA CoEi ANN. § 78B-6-117 (2008) ("A child may not be adopted by a
person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage
under the laws of this state.").
133. See S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 827-28 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (noting in dicta
that an unmarried couple cannot use the state's stepparent adoption procedure).
134. See In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 382-83 (Neb. 2002) (refusing to
recognize second-parent adoption).
135. See Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 500 (N.C. 2010) (holding that North Car-
olina law does not allow second-parent adoptions).
136. In re Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1072-73 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (finding
that second-parent adoption is not available under Ohio law).
137. In re Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 683 (Wis. 1994) (finding that second-par-
ent adoption is not available under Wisconsin law).
138. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, at *1 (2011); Fla. Dep't of
Children and Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So.3d 79, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); see
also David Groshoff, The Wrong Track, Baby-How Damage to Gay Youth Was Borne
This Way: Via Ideologically Bound Law Reviews Publishing "Hopey Changey Stuff," 18
CARoozo WoMIN's L.J. 275 (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1905606 (providing an interesting account of the events surrounding the adoption
and repeal of the Florida and Arkansas statutes and the role of law reviews in perpetuating
damaging perceptions of the queer community).
139. See Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay Parents Must be Recognized
by Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Despite Anti-Marriage Statutes that
Discriminate Against Same-Sex Couples, 31 CAP. U. L. Re~v. 751 (2003); see also David
Groshoff, The Wrong Track, Baby: How Damage to Gay Youth Was Borne This Way: Via
Ideologically Bound Law Reviews Publishing "Hopey Changey Stuff," 18 CARDOZO Wo-
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section describes two circuit court decisions that exemplify the uncertain-
ties brought about by the plethora of contradicting adoption laws affect-
ing gay and lesbian couples-Finstuen v. Crutcher and Adar v. Smith.
III. FINSTUEN V. CRUTCHER vs. ADAR v. SMITH
In Finstuen, the Tenth Circuit ordered the State Registrar to issue a
supplemental birth certificate to a same-sex couple that adopted a child
out-of-state.14o In Adar, the Fifth Circuit reached the opposite result."'
To set the stage for a clear comparison of the apparently conflicting treat-
ment created by Adar and Finstuen, this part provides necessary back-
ground information. Because both cases involve interstate adoption, the
decisions inherently raise questions of constitutional full faith and
credit.' 4 2 Therefore, the following section first explains the Supreme
Court's view of the role of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in recognition
and enforcement of out-of-state judgments. Because Adar assigned the
differing outcome in Finstuen to supposedly dissimilar state laws regard-
ing issuance of supplemental birth certificates, 4 1 this section also summa-
rizes the reasoning of the Finstuen and Adar courts and describes the
Oklahoma and Louisiana laws implicated in the two cases.
A. The Constitutional Reach of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
The Full Faith and Credit Clause receives little scholarly attention.14 4
In plain language the Clause states that "Full faith and credit shall be
given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
every other state."14 5 The Clause's statutory counterpart carries similar
language.1 46 The purpose of the Clause, as stated by the Supreme Court,
mN's L.J. 275 (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1905606 (giving in-
formation about the repeal of the Florida and Arkansas statutes).
140. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007).
141. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 159 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert denied, 132 S.Ct.
400 (2011); Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay Parents Must be Recognized by
Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Despite Anti-Marriage Statutes that
Discriminate Against Same-Sex Couples, 31 CAP. U. L. Riv. 751, 752 (2003).
142. Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay Parents Must be Recognized by
Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Despite Anti-Marriage Statutes that
Discriminate Against Same-Sex Couples, 31 CAP. U. L. Riv. 751, 752 (2003).
143. Adar, 639 F.3d at 157, 159.
144. Polly J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. Riv. 747,
754 (1998).
145. U.S. CONs-. art IV, § 1.
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) ("Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies
thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts
of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."). Congress enacted the
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is to "preserve rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts and
judicial proceedings of one state by requiring recognition of their validity
in other states."' 4 7 Over the years, the Court has produced a solid body
of law interpreting the Clause and established well-reasoned judicial rules
that interpret its meaning and reach."' A number of these rules are par-
ticularly relevant to the issue of interstate adoption.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the reach of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to be different for statutes and judgments.14 9 As to the full
faith and credit due statutes, the Clause cannot be invoked where the
forum state is competent to legislate with respect to that subject mat-
ter.' Moreover, a forum state need not apply a sister state statute if
such application would violate the forum state's "legitimate public pol-
icy."15 1 In connection with judgments, however, the full faith and credit
implementing statute for the Full Faith and Credit Clause in 1790. Act of May 26, 1790, ch.
11, 1 Stat. 122. The Clause stated:
[t]hat the acts of the legislatures of the several states shall be authenticated by having
the seal of their respective states affixed thereto: That the records and judicial pro-
ceedings of the courts of any state, shall be proved or admitted in any other court
within the United States, by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court
annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the judge, chief justice, or
presiding magistrate, as the case may be, that the said attestation is in due form. And
the said records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such
faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by
law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be
taken.
Act of May 26,1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. The statute was amended only once in 1948. 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
147. Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Indus, Accident Comm'n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493, 501
(1939).
148. See, e.g., Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 240-41 (1998) (holding
that Michigan cannot protect a witness from another jurisdiction's subpoena power; that
subpoena is given Michigan's full faith and credit); Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717,
734 (1988) (finding that a state can apply their own statute of limitations "even if governed
by the substantive law of a different State"); Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261,
286 (1980) (stating that "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause should not be construed to
preclude successive workmen's compensation awards"); Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White
Co., 296 U.S. 268, 279 (1935) (holding that "a judgment is not to be denied full faith and
credit in state and federal courts merely because it is for taxes").
149. See Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493,504-05
(1939) (holding that "[flull faith and credit does not here enable one state to legislate for
the other or to protect its laws across state lines so as to preclude the other from prescrib-
ing for itself the legal consequences of acts within it").
150. Id.
151. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 489 (2003) ("The Court has
already ruled that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a forum State to apply
a sister State's sovereign immunity statutes where such application would violate the forum
State's own legitimate public policy.").
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obligation is "exacting. "152 There is "no roving 'public policy exception'
to the full faith and credit due judgments," and the rule applies equally to
judgments in law as well as equity.1 3
With reference to judgments, the court has created a distinction be-
tween recognition and enforcement.'54 A final judgment rendered by a
court exercising proper jurisdiction "qualifies for recognition throughout
the land.""' The mechanisms for enforcing a judgment, however, "re-
main subject to the evenhanded control of forum law."'5 In other words,
the Full Faith and Credit Clause merely mandates a forum state to recog-
nize a sister state's judgment, but leaves the enforcement, or execution, of
a foreign judgment to the laws and procedures of the forum state. The
parties involved in the two suits discussed in this Note struggled with the
understanding of these two abstract terms as applied to issuance of sup-
plemental birth certificates based on out-of-state adoption decrees. 5 7
The following section describes the state statutes that were implicated in
Finstuen and Adar as well as each court's reasoning.
152. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 240-41 (holding that Michigan cannot protect a witness
from another jurisdiction's subpoena power; that subpoena is given Michigan's full faith
and credit); see also Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948):
The fact that the requirements of full faith and credit so far as judgments are con-
cerned, are exacting, if not inexorable, does not mean, however, that the State of the
domicile of one spouse may, through the use of constructive service, enter a decree
that changes every legal incidence of the marriage relationship.
153. Baker, 522 U.S. at 223.
154. This Note does not discuss whether adoption decrees constitute judgments, as
there is practically a universal understanding that they do. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a)
(2009) ("'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an
appeal lies.").
155. Baker, 522 U.S. at 233.
156. Id. at 235; see also McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312, 324 (1839) ("To give it the
force of a judgment in another state, it must be made a judgment there; and can only be
executed in the latter as its laws may permit.").
157. See Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 160, 166, 177 (5th Cir. 2011) (showing that the
justices on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals cannot agree on the meaning of the two
terms as applied to issuance of supplemental birth certificates); Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496
F.3d 1139, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2007). The parties to the two suits are likely not the only
ones trying to untangle the meaning of the two terms. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 235 (asserting
that states have to recognize the judgment from a sister state but do not have to enforce
the judgment if it contradicts that state's law); see also Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,
320 U.S. 430, 455 (1943) (explaining that a state is not required to enforce every judgment
of a sister state if the state's jurisdiction is contrary to the judgment); Hannah v. Gen.
Motor Corp., 969 F. Supp. 554, 559 (D. Ariz. 1996). Unfortunately, the issues raised by the
meaning of the words recognition and enforcement are outside of the scope of this article.
For the purposes of this text, it is assumed that laws governing the issuance of supplemen-
tal birth certificates constitute enforcement outside of the reach of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
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B. The Oklahoma Approach
1. Laws Governing Adoption and Issuance of Supplemental Birth
Certificates
In the wake of Massachusetts's approval of same-sex marriages, the
Attorney General of Oklahoma"s' issued a number of opinions pertain-
ing to same-sex couples and their rights under Oklahoma law.' 59 In one,
the Attorney General specified that "[u]nder Oklahoma law, a marriage
is a civil contract between one man and one woman."' He added that
neither Oklahoma law, the Defense of Marriage Act, nor the Full Faith
and Credit Clause "require[d] Oklahoma to recognize, as valid and bind-
ing, same-gender marriages performed in other states."' 6 ' In another
opinion, relying on judicial precedent, the Attorney General opined that
unmarried individuals are ineligible to jointly adopt under Oklahoma
law.' 6 2 Because Oklahoma did not recognize any form of same-sex mar-
riage and only married couples could jointly adopt under its laws, the
Attorney General concluded that "same-gender petitioners are among
those who are ineligible to adopt in Oklahoma."' Yet, in the same
opinion the Attorney General stated that Oklahoma, under its own laws
and under the mandate of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, must "recog-
nize out-of-state adoption decrees establishing the relationship of parent
and child, irrespective of whether the adoptive parents are eligible to
158. The Attorney General of Oklahoma at the time was William Andrew Edmond-
son. See generally EXECuIvE BRANCH, OF. OF THE Arr. GEN., http://
www.odl.state.ok.us/sginfo/oksglattorney-general.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2012) (providing
information about the State Attorney General).
159. See, e.g., Op. Att'y Gen. 04-008 (Okla. 2004), available at 2004 WL 557472
("Must the Oklahoma State Department of Health comply with a request from same-gen-
der adoptive parents to produce an Oklahoma supplementary birth certificate pursuant to
an out-of-state adoption decree?"); Op. Att'y Gen. 04-010 (Okla. 2004), available at 2004
WL 557473 ("Does Oklahoma law consider marriage to be between one woman and one
man? Is Oklahoma required to recognize as valid and binding a marriage performed in
another state which is not between one woman and one man?").
160. Op. Att'y Gen. 04-010 (Okla. 2004), available at 2004 WL 557473.
161. Id. Oklahoma voters added this provision into the state's constitution in the No-
vember 2004 election. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35 ("Marriage .. . shall consist only of the
union of one man and one woman."); Election Results, CNN (2004), http://www.cnn.com/
ELECTION/2004/pages/results/ballot.measures/. 76% of voters voted "yes" and embraced
State Question 711. Id. Election Results, CNN (2004), http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/
2004/pages/results/ballot.
162. See Op. Att'y Gen., supra notel60 (stating that "more than one single (unmar-
ried) person cannot adopt a child in Oklahoma").
163. Id.; see also Adoption of M.C.D. v. Depew, 42 P.3d 873, 881 (Okla. Civ. App.
2002) ("The requested adoption by two divorcing persons fails to fit within any of the
statutory categories of those eligible to adopt.").
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adopt in this state."' Accordingly, he added that Oklahoma laws re-
quired the Oklahoma Department of Health to issue supplemental birth
certificates to same-sex couples "upon receipt of a certificate of a decree
of adoption."1 65 He also added that "upon receipt of a certified copy of
an adoption decree, the parentage established therein must be reflected
on the supplementary birth certificate[,]" essentially stating that
Oklahoma law required the Oklahoma Department of Health to issue
supplemental birth certificates to same-sex couples.1 66 According to stat-
ute, the revised certificates should reflect "the names of the adoptive par-
ents listed as the parents."' 6 1
In response to the Attorney General's opinion requiring recognition of
out-of-state same-sex parent adoptions and subsequent issuance of re-
vised birth certificates to these couples, the Oklahoma legislators pro-
posed to amend the state's Adoption Code.'6 8 The proposed bill stated
that "[the] state, any of its agencies, or any court of [the] state shall not
recognize an adoption by more than one individual of the same sex from
any other state or foreign jurisdiction."'6' The Oklahoma House of Rep-
resentatives passed House Bill 1821 by an overwhelming 93-4 vote."o
After the Senate's unanimous approval, the Governor signed the amend-
ment into law in May 2004. 1 " Following the inclusion of the amendment,
the Oklahoma Adoption Code read:
The courts of this state shall recognize a decree, judgment, or final
order creating the relationship of parent and child by adoption, is-
164. Op. Att'y Gen., supra notel60.
165. See id. (explaining the Attorney General's opinion).
166. Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 161.
167. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-6.6(B) (2007).
168. See Rhonda Wasserman, Are You Still My Mother?: Interstate Recognition of
Adoption by Gays and Lesbians, 58 AM. U. L. Rpv. 1, 18 (2008) ("The very next business
day [after the issuance of the Attorney General's opinion], Republican lawmakers in the
Oklahoma legislature 'vowed . . . to enact legislation banning recognition of out-of-state
adoptions of Oklahoma children by same-sex couples."') (quoting Marie Price, GOP Vows
Gay Adoption Law: Lawmakers Hope to Ban Recognition of Out-of-State Adoptions by
Same-Sex Partners, TuISA WORLD, Mar. 23, 2004, at A14).
169. OKIA. STATr. ANN. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4 (2007), held unconstitutional by Finstuen v.
Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007).
170. HRC Urges Oklahoma Governor to Veto Anti-Family Measure, Hum. RTs. CAM-
PAIGN (Apr. 27, 2004), http://sites.hrc.org/issues/parenting/custody/2128.htm; Oklahoma
NOT OK for Gay and Lesbian Parents, Rueountic oiF T. AiRciiiVES BLoo (Apr. 28, 2004),
http://archives.republicoft.com/index.php/archives/2004/04/28/oklahoma-strongnotstrong-
ok-for-gay-lesbian-parents/.
171. HRC Urges Oklahoma Governor to Veto Anti-Family Measure, Hum. Ris. CAM-
PAIGN (Apr. 27, 2004), http://sites.hrc.org/issues/parenting/custody/2128.htm; Week in Re-
view, OKLAHOMA SLNATE (May 2004), http://www.oksenate.gov/news/weekinreview/
week in review2004/wir2004050306.htmi.
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sued by a court or other governmental authority with appropriate
jurisdiction in a foreign country or in another state or territory of the
United States. The rights and obligations of the parties as to matters
within the jurisdiction of this state shall be determined as though the
decree, judgment, or final order were issued by a court of this state.
Except that, this state, any of its agencies, or any court of this state
shall not recognize an adoption by more than one individual of the
same sex from any other state or foreign jurisdiction.17 2
Relying on the above amendment, the Oklahoma State Registrar re-
fused to issue a revised birth certificate with both parents' names to an
adoptive same-sex couple.173 This act ultimately resulted in the Finstuen
lawsuit. 1 74 The following section describes the facts behind that case as
well as the court's reasoning in invalidating the amendment and ordering
Oklahoma to issue the supplemental birth certificate."
2. Finstuen v. Crutcher
In 2006, an unmarried same-sex couple, Lucy and Jennifer Doel, chal-
lenged the 2004 amendment to Oklahoma's Adoption Code.' The
Doels adopted Ellie, an Oklahoma-born child, in California in 2002."
Lucy Doel adopted Ellie in January and Jennifer Doel did the same six
months later in a second parent adoption."' The Doels then moved to
Oklahoma and requested a revised birth certificate.' 7 9 The Oklahoma
State Department of Health issued a supplemental birth certificate nam-
ing only Lucy as a parent.1 so The Department denied the couple's re-
quest to include Jennifer's name on the child's supplemental birth
certificate.' 1 The Doels filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that the language of the 2004 amendment, which "[stood] as a
barrier to the issuance of an accurate birth certificate for Ellie," violated
172. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4 (2007) held unconstitutional by Crutcher,
496 F.3d at 1156 (amendment in italics, emphasis added).
173. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id. (detailing the circumstances leading up to the Doels' lawsuit challenging
the Oklahoma Adoption Code). Initially, three same-sex families challenged the 2004
amendment to Oklahoma's statute governing recognition of out-of-state adoptions; how-
ever, on appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the court recognized only the Doels' standing to
challenge the statute. Id.
177. Id. at 1142.
178. Id.
179. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301 (W.D. Okla. 2006).
180. Crutcher, 496 F.3d. at 1142.
181. Id.
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the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.'8 2 Their argu-
ments succeeded in the district court.' 83
The Court of Appeals reviewed the couple's full faith and credit claim
de novo.'8 4 Relying on the Supreme Court's distinction between statutes
and judgments, it first addressed whether a final adoption decree consti-
tutes a judgment."' The court referred to Black's Law Dictionary and
Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in concluding that an
adoption "decree" or "order" is in fact a final judgment for purposes of a
Full Faith and Credit Clause analysis.' Since "the full faith and credit
obligation is exacting" for judgments, it ruled that "final adoption or-
ders . .. are entitled to recognition by all other states under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause."' 8 7
The Department of Health argued that recognition of the couple's Cal-
ifornia adoption decree would amount to an "impermissible, extra-terri-
torial application of California law in Oklahoma."' Rejecting this
reasoning, the court pointed out that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
merely dictates that Oklahoma recognize the adoptive relationship it-
self-that Lucy and Jennifer are Ellie's parents.' 89 As a consequence,
Oklahoma still retains the ability to define the rights and obligations that
flow from an adoptive relationship.1 " The court then pointed out that
Oklahoma "has spoken on that subject" when it decided to give adoptive
parents "the relation of parent and child and all the rights, duties, and
other legal consequences of the natural relation of child and parent."' 91
182. Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2 Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F.
Supp. 2d 1295 (W.D. Okla. 2006) (No. 04CV1152), 2004 WL 3139176.
183. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1315 ("By its refusal to recognize and give effect
to a valid judgment, from another court of competent jurisdiction, which established their
status as parents of their respective children, the Amendment violates the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.").
184. Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1152.
185. Id.
186. Id.
Despite the fact that courts may use different words, such as 'decree' or 'order,' to
refer to final adoption decisions, it is clear that all such decisions are 'judgments'
under the common definition of the term as a 'court's final determination of the rights
and obligations of the parties in a case. The term judgment includes an equitable
decree and any order from which an appeal lies.
187. Id. at 1156.
188. Id. at 1153.
189. Id. at 1151.
190. Id. at 1154.
191. Id.; OKI-A. SrAr. tit. 10, § 7505-6.6(B) (2001).
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With that in mind, the court affirmed the district court's order to issue a
revised birth certificate to the Doels.19 2
C. The Louisiana Approach
1. Laws Governing Adoption and Issuance of Supplemental Birth
Certificates
Like Oklahoma, Louisiana does not permit unmarried couples to
jointly adopt children."' The Louisiana Children's Code expressly per-
mits either "[a] single person, eighteen years or older, or a married
couple jointly [to petition for adoption]."1 94 As pointed out in an Opin-
ion of the Attorney General of Louisiana, "[t]here is no provision al-
lowing for two unmarried persons . . . . to adopt a child jointly."1 95 This
lack of express permission has been interpreted to ban unmarried couples
from joint adoption. Additionally, Louisiana does not sanction same-sex
marriages and the Louisiana Constitution expressly prohibits recognition
of same-sex marriages performed elsewhere.' 9 6 Because of Louisiana's
proscription of joint adoption by unmarried couples and its prohibition
and non-recognition of same-sex marriages, Louisiana in effect bans joint
adoption by all same-sex couples.' Based on this, the Louisiana Attor-
ney General concluded that the state "is not required to recognize an
adoption by a same[-]sex couple [even] when the state in which the adop-
tion took place recognizes same[-]sex marriages . . . because same sex
marriages violate Louisiana's public policy and need not be recognized
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause." 98
192. Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1156; see Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1315 (explaining
that "the Court directs Defendant Crutcher and the Oklahoma Department of Health to
issue a birth certificate for E., identifying Jennifer and Lucy Doel as her parents").
193. Op. Att'y Gen. La. 06-0325, at 1 (Apr. 18, 2007) (stating that "[t]here is no provi-
sion allowing for two unmarried persons (whether of the same sex or not) to adopt a child
jointly"), available at http://www.ag.state.1a.us/Shared/ViewDoc.aspx?Type=4&Doc=1 8900.
194. LA. CiLDci. CODE ANN. art. 1221 (2011); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1198
(2011).
195. La. Att'y Gen. 325, supra note 193
196. LA. CONs r. art. XII, § 15 ("No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall
recognize any marriage contracted in any other jurisdiction which is not the union of one
man and one woman."); LA. Civ. Con ANN. art. 89 (2012) ("Persons of the same sex may
not contract marriage with each other.").
197. See LA. CONSI. art. XII, § 15 (detailing Louisiana's prohibition of same-sex mar-
riages and its position on same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions); LA. Cn III CoDo
ANN. art. 1198, 1221 (2004) (describing Louisiana's policy regarding persons who may peti-
tion for adoption in both agency and private adoption situations).
198. Vital Records Rejection of Out-of-State Adoption Judgments, Op. La. Att'y
Gen. 026-0235, at 3 (April 18, 2007), 2007 WL 1438453, available at http://www.ag.state.1a.
us/Shared/ViewDoc.aspx?Type=4&Doc1890; see LA. CmnD CoDE ANN. art. 1198, 1221
(2004) (clarifying that Louisiana only permits married couples to adopt either through an
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In terms of revised birth records, Louisiana law permits "a person born
in Louisiana [and] adopted in a court of proper jurisdiction in any other
state" to obtain a supplemental birth certificate.' The statute states that
"[ulpon receipt of the certified copy of the [out-of-state adoption] decree,
the state registrar shall make a new record in its archives, show-
ing .. . [t]he names of the adoptive parents." 2 00 The law does not define
the term "adoptive parents." 2 0 ' This lack of definition then led the Loui-
siana Registrar to rely on the state's prohibition of joint adoption by un-
married couples in refusing to issue a revised birth certificate showing
both parents' names to an unmarried same-sex couple.202 These facts
gave rise to the Adar lawsuit. The following section focuses on Adar and
describes the Fifth Circuit panel and en banc decisions.
a. Adar v. Smith
In 2007, a same-sex couple challenged the determination of the Louisi-
ana Attorney General that the State Registrar need not recognize out-of-
agency or privately). The Attorney General's interpretation, which prohibits even mere
recognition, would likely be held unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit clause.
The Clause requires exacting recognition of judgments. It is state law enforcement of judg-
ments that the Constitution cannot reach. See, e.g., Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (overturning decisions by a circuit panel and a district court that had held
that Louisiana's refusal to issue a new original birth certificate for the Louisiana-born child
legally adopted by an unmarried same-sex couple in New York violated the Full Faith and
Credit Clause); La. Att'y Gen. 325, supra note 193.
199. LA. Riav. STAT. ANN. § 40:76A (2012). LA. Rpv. STATr. ANN. § 40:76(A) (2010).
200. LA. RiW. STAr. ANN. § 40:76C(3) (2012). LA. Riy. STAT. ANN. § 40:76(C)
(2010).
201. See LA. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 40:76 (2012) (using the term "adoptive parents" but
providing no definition); Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697, 715 (5th Cir. 2010) ("The Registrar
does not offer, and our research does not reveal, any place where the phrase 'adoptive
parents' is expressly defined in the Louisiana Civil Code, the State's statutes, or the case
law."), rev'd en banc, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011); but see LA. CiiDi CoiE ANN. art.
1270A (2012) (noting that adoption "terminat[es] . .. parental rights and responsibilities of
biological parents and . . . creat[es] . . . the relationship of parent and child between an
adopted person and his adoptive parents"); Succession of D'Asaro, 167 So.2d 391, 395 (La.
Ct. App. 1964) (indicating that "[in Louisiana the adopted person is considered for all
intents and purposes as a legitimate child and forced heir of the adoptive parent"). It is
quite unfortunate that the language of the Louisiana statute (LA. C-nti CoowE ANN. art.
1270A (2012)) does not utilize gender-neutral language. Perhaps Louisiana can learn from
Illinois, which created a commission with the sole purpose of "makfing] the Illinois Com-
piled Statutes gender neutral." 5 IiL. CouMr. STAT. ANN. 90/10 (LexisNexis Supp 2012).
LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 40:76 (2010); Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2010) ("The
Registrar does not offer, and our research does not reveal, any place where the phrase
'adoptive parents' is expressly defined in the Louisiana Civil Code, the State's statutes, or
the case law."), rev'd en banc, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011).
202. See LA. CILD COM- ANN. art. 1198, 1221 (2004) (limiting agency and private in-
state adoption to married couples or single people over the age of eighteen).
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state adoption decrees obtained by same-sex parents. 0 3 Oren Adar and
Mickey Ray Smith, an unmarried same-sex couple, adopted a Louisiana-
born infant in New York in April 2005.204 After obtaining the adoption
decree, the couple requested the Louisiana Department of Health and
Hospitals, Office of Public Health, Vital Records and Statistics, to issue a
new birth certificate reflecting the names of the adoptive parents.2 05 The
office requested an opinion of the State's Attorney General on the is-
sue.2 0 6 In response, the Attorney General opined: "Louisiana does not
owe full faith and credit to the instant New York adoption judgment be-
cause it is repugnant to Louisiana's public policy of not allowing joint
adoptions by unmarried persons."20 7 Subsequently, relying on Louisiana
law, the Registrar informed the adoptive parents that she was "not able
to accept the New York adoption judgment to create a new birth certifi-
cate."20 8 Instead the Registrar offered to place one of the parents' names
on the birth certificate since Louisiana allows single-parent adoptions.2 0 9
The couple filed a lawsuit in federal court against the Registrar in her
official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.210 The plaintiffs alleged viola-
tions of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.2 1 1 In granting summary judgment for the plain-
tiffs, the district court turned solely to full faith and credit and Louisiana
203. See La. Att'y Gen. 325, supra note 193; Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857, 859
(E.D. La. 2008) ("[The State Registrar] further relied on an advisory opinion from the
Louisiana Attorney General's Office, which concluded that Louisiana is not required to
give full faith and credit to an out-of-state adoption decree that violates Louisiana public
policy.").
204. See Adar, 597 F.3d at 701.
205. See Adar, 597 F.3d at 701 (illustrating that the adoptive parents had the New
York Department of Health forward a Report of Adoption to the necessary agency in
Louisiana to obtain the new birth certificate).
206. See Adar, 597 F.3d at 701 (asserting that prior to making a decision on whether
or not to issue a new birth certificate, the Department of Health and Hospitals wanted to
know if Louisiana was required to do so).
207. Adar, 597 F.3d at 701.
208. Adar, 597 F.3d at 701. The Louisiana State Registrar declined to accept the New
York adoption decree because Louisiana law only recognizes in-state adoptions by married
couples or single adults, giving the Registrar full discretion in issuing birth certificates, and
authorizing only the Registrar to issue amended birth certificates. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 150 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating the adoptive parents
are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the Regis-
trar's action denies equal protection to them and the child and denies full faith and credit
to the adoption decree issued in New York); see also Compl. for Declaratory and Injunc-
tive Relief at 1, Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. La. 2007) (No. 07-6541) ("Plain-
tiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 to redress the deprivation under
color of state law of rights secured by the [U.S.] Constitution.").
211. Adar, 597 F.3d at 702.
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law, and did not reach the couple's equal protection claim.2 12 The de-
fendants appealed to the Fifth Circuit.213 On appeal, the court of appeals
relied on the Supreme Court's clear distinction between the full faith and
credit owed statutes and judgments.2 14 Reasoning that there is "virtually
universal agreement that adoption decrees are judgments[,]" the court
held that Louisiana "must recognize that the Adoptive Parents are Infant
J's legal parents."2"
Like the Tenth Circuit, the court held that while out-of-state judgments
must be recognized, "provisions for enforcing [them] are determined by
the law of the forum state."216 Like the Tenth Circuit, the court thus
went on to evaluate whether Louisiana's statutes mandated the State
Registrar to issue a revised birth certificate listing both adoptive parents'
names.2 17 The court first ruled that as a matter of separation of powers, it
would amount to unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority if the
State Registrar were allowed to unconditionally decide whether or not to
issue a revised birth certificate.2 8 It then rejected the Registrar's argu-
ment that the phrase "adoptive parents" in Section 40:76(C) should be
interpreted in light of the state's proscription of joint adoptions by un-
married couples.2 " As support, the court relied on the Louisiana Su-
preme Court's decision in Crescionne v. Louisiana State Police Retirement
212. Id.
213. Id. at 701.
214. Id. at 707; Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 223 (1998).
215. Adar, 597 F.3d at 708, 711.
216. Id. at 708.
217. Id. at 713-15.
218. Id. at 715-18.
219. Id. at 718-19. In its holding the Court rejected a number of other arguments
brought by the defendant in support of her contention that Louisiana does not owe exact-
ing recognition to out-of-state adoption decrees. Id. Specifically, the Registrar argued that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause is only coextensive with the reach of traditional res judi-
cata principles-i.e. to prevent future litigation. Id. at 709. As such, because alteration of
records (and not re-litigation) was at issue, Louisiana's recognition of the out-of-state
adoption decree would be "no different than requiring Louisiana to substitute a New York
statute for one of its own." Id. Additionally, "because Louisiana was not party to the New
York proceedings," the Registrar argued that the state could not be required to obey the
adoption decree. Id. In rejecting the argument, the court made clear that res judicata is a
voluntary principle while full faith and credit is a mandatory constitutional curb and the
"modus vivendi of federalism." Id. at 709-10. It reasoned that non-recognition of a judg-
ment simply because it is based on a statute was not supported by precedent and was
merely a "circular attempt to conflate 'judgment' and 'statute."' Id. at 710. In any event,
the judgment itself was not an attempt to compel action by Louisiana; instead it sought
Louisiana to respect the adjudicated parent-child relationship. Id at 711.
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Board,22 0 which established that where a statute provides no special defi-
nition of an unambiguous term, it must be given "ordinary, commonly
understood meaning .... "22' Because the term "adoptive parents" is
unambiguous and not defined anywhere in the statute, the court ruled
that it should be given the ordinary meaning of "a father or mother who
adopts a child" and ordered the Registrar to make a new record reflect-
ing both plaintiffs' names.22 2
b. Adar v. Smith Revisited
In 2011, the Fifth Circuit voted to rehear Adar v. Smith2 2 3 en banc and
vacated the panel's previous decision.2 24 On rehearing, the court invoked
the well-established Baker rule, which states that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause mandates recognition of judgments but cannot compel their
enforcement under state law.2 25 With respect to recognition, the court
held that the Registrar's refusal to issue a revised birth certificate with
both parents' names did not deny the plaintiffs recognition of the foreign
adoption decree. 226 In support of this conclusion, the court noted that
"the Registrar recognize[d] Appellees as the legal parents of their
adopted child" and conceded that "the parental relationship . . . cannot
be relitigated in Louisiana." 22 7
Moreover, the court added that it is "[florum state law [that] deter-
mines what incidental property rights flow from a validly recognized
judgment."2 2 8 The court analogized to the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Rosin v. Monken,2 2 9 which refused to honor a New York plea agreement
220. See Crescionne v. La. State Police Ret. Bd., 455 So.2d 1362, 1363 (La. 1984) (rea-
soning that "only when one statute is unclear that another on the same subject should be
called in aid to explain it").
221. See id. at 1364 ("Since there is no special statutory definition of the term 'surviv-
ing spouse,' we hold that it must be given its ordinary, commonly understood meaning
222. Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697, 719 (5th Cir. 2010).
223. See generally Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
224. See id. at 150 (vacating prior decision).
225. Id. ("The states' duty to 'recognize' sister state judgments, however, does not
compel states to 'adopt the practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and mech-
anisms for enforcing judgments."').
226. Id. ("[T]he Registrar's refusal to place two names on the certificate can in no way
constitute a denial of full faith and credit."); see id. at 159-61 (describing background case
law where the Full Faith and Credit Clause similarly served as the focal point of
contention).
227. Id. at 159
228. Id.
229. See generally Rosin v. Monken, 599 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2010) (describing a case in
which an Illinois resident claimed that his having to relocate and register as a sex-offender
for life violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
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in Illinois.2"o The agreement, which had been reduced to a judgment,
indicated that the plaintiff need not register as a sex offender. 2 31 The
court refused to honor the agreement because the Full Faith and Credit
Clause did not require Illinois to "dispense with its preferred mechanism
for protecting its citizenry by virtue merely of a foreign judgment that
envisioned less restrictive requirements." 2 32 Similarly, the Adar court
concluded that Louisiana law, and not full faith and credit, governed the
"incidental benefits of a foreign judgment."" Based on this, it held that
"[o]btaining a birth certificate falls in the heartland of enforcement, and
therefore outside the full faith and credit obligation of recognition."2 3 4
Turning to the state laws in question, the court, without any reasoning to
support its conclusion, held that Louisiana law "does not permit any un-
married couples-whether adopting out-of-state or in-state-to obtain
revised birth certificates."2 3
Unlike the Tenth Circuit in Finstuen and the Fifth Circuit panel in
Adar, the en banc court also addressed an entirely different legal issue to
support its holding-the propriety of using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate
alleged violations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in federal courts."'
230. Adar, 639 F.3d at 160-61.
231. Rosin v. Monken, 599 F.3d 574, 575 (7th Cir. 2010).
232. Id. at 577.
233. Adar, 639 F.3d at 161.
234. Id. at 177.
235. Id. at 161. Note that Louisiana law does not expressly prohibit unmarried
couples from obtaining birth certificates. See LA. CILD. Coon ANN. art. 1221 (2004) ("A
single person . . . may petition to privately adopt a child."). To reach this conclusion, the
court combined two separate statutes-one that permits out-of-state "adoptive parents" to
receive supplemental birth certificates, and another that does not permit unmarried
couples to adopt in Louisiana. Adar, 639 F.3d at 161; LA. Rizv. S TA c. ANN. § 40:76 (2010).
236. Adar, 639 F.3d at 151. While a discussion of Section 1983 exceeds the scope of
this article, it is an important issue worth noting because it constitutes an essential part of
the conflict between Finstuen and Adar. See generally Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139,
1153-54 (10th Cir. 2007); Adar, 639 F.3d at 146-62. In Finstuen, neither the district court
nor the Tenth Circuit expressly addressed the applicability of Section 1983 to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, although the plaintiffs' complaint clearly stated that the action was
brought under that Section. Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Finstuen v.
Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (W.D. Okla. 2006) (No. 04CV1152), 2004 WL 3139176.
("Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 to redress the deprivation
under color of state law of rights secured by the [U.S.] Constitution."); Finstuen v.
Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1153 (10th Cir. 2007). Similarly, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
have entertained Section 1983 actions in cases addressing violations of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause without questioning the propriety of doing so. See Rosin v. Monken, 599
F.3d 574, 575 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Mitchell Rosin brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983");
United Farm Workers of America v. Ariz. Agric. Emp't Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249, 1252
(9th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he UFW alleged claims for relief under ... 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983."). On
the other hand, the majority of the en banc court's decision in Adar dealt with the inappli-
cability of Section 1983 to claims of alleged violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
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Adar, 639 F.3d at 151-58. That section authorizes a private cause of action in federal court
for "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added). The crux of the problem for the en banc
court was the fact that neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor its implementing stat-
ute conferred any right, privilege, or immunity that could be vindicated under Section 1983.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added); Adar, 639 F.3d at 151-52. This issue, which the
defendant first raised during the en banc review, sparked a popular debate and played a
prime role in the various briefs supporting the request for certiorari. Supplemental Brief
of Appellees Oren Adar and Mickey Ray Smith on En Banc Review at 4-5, Adar, 639 F.3d
146 ("Never having raised the issue below, Registrar now contends that the court below
lacked federal jurisdiction to hear a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983."); Brief of
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, et al., in Support of the Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 3, Adar v.
Smith, 132 U.S. 400 (2011) (No. 11-46) ("Section 1983 provides a cause of action to enforce
the Full Faith and Credit Clause against state executive officers."). In their petition for
certiorari, the Adar plaintiffs termed the discrepancy in the courts' treatment of Section
1983 a "circuit split." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Adar v. Smith, 132 U.S. 400
(2011) (No. 11-46) ("The Fifth Circuit's Limitation On The Scope Of Section 1983 Creates
A Circuit Split."). Scholars have done the same since. Steve Sanders, Interstate Recogni-
tion of Parent-Child Relationships: The Limits of the State Interests Paradigm and the Role
of Due Process, 2011 U. Cin. LEGAL F. 233, 263 (2011) ("The Fifth Circuit's en banc deci-
sion thus creates a split with the Tenth Circuit's decision in Finstuen over whether the
federal courts are available to enforce full faith and credit for an adoption decree."). This
Note avoids the phrase "circuit split," given that neither the Seventh, Ninth, nor Tenth
Circuits expressly addressed whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause confers a "right,
privilege, or immunity" for purpose of Section 1983. See generally Rosin v. Monken, 599
F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2010); United Farm Workers of America v. Ariz. Agric. Emp't Relations
Bd., 669 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1982); Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
However, although the parties in Rosin and Finstuen never raised the issue, it is important
to point out that both courts had the chance to answer the same question sua sponte under
a different statute implicated in the two cases-28 U.S.C. § 1343. This section grants fed-
eral courts subject matter jurisdiction over actions seeking "[t]o redress the depriva-
tion ... of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(2006) (emphasis added). As shown above, the language of Sections 1343 and 1983 is vir-
tually the same and both statutes refer to constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). In fact, Sections 1343 and 1983 al-
ways go hand in hand and both date back to the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Ku Klux Klan
Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006) and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)). The plaintiffs in Finstuen cited both sections in their complaints.
Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2-4, Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp.
2d 1295 (W.D. Okla. 2006) (No. 04CV1152), 2004 WL 3139176. It is established practice
that courts may raise issues pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. FiED. R.
Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdic-
tion, the court must dismiss the action."). In fact, with respect to subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Court has made it the courts' duty to raise the issue where federal
jurisdiction is doubtful. Clark v. Paul Gray, 306 U.S. 583, 588 (1939), superseded by statute
on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000), as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapat-
tah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 547 (2005); McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of
India, 298 U.S. 178, 182 (1936); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152
(1908); Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 589 (1888). Although the court in Finstuen
had a chance to question the applicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a constitu-
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Section 1983 permits a private cause of action in federal court for "depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion." 2 37 The court explained that although the Supreme Court has at
times referred to full faith and credit in terms of individual rights, it con-
sistently identified the state courts (as opposed to state executive officers)
as violators.2 3 8 Because a claimant cannot assert the right until trial, the
court viewed the Full Faith and Credit Clause as merely imposing a duty
on the courts rather than granting an individual right to the people.
The court based its conclusion on the understanding that full faith and
credit is merely coextensive with principles of res judicata.24 0 On these
tional right, privilege, or immunity under Section 1343 sua sponte, they did not do so. Fin-
stuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300, 1315 (W.D. Okla. 2006). Because
Sections 1343 and 1983 implicate the same question-whether the Full Faith and Credit
Clause confers a constitutional right, privilege, or immunity-the courts' inaction with re-
spect to Section 1343 could further suggest their approval of using Section 1983 to vindi-
cate full faith and credit claims. Whether the Seventh and Tenth Circuits' omissions were a
deliberate exercise of their duty to raise doubtful claims of federal jurisdiction sua sponte
or, as the Fifth Circuit would have it, the courts failed to spot an issue only the Fifth circuit
saw, we will never know. What we do know, however, is that the Fifth circuit, by denying
the right to bring a Full Faith and Credit Clause claim under Section 1983, in effect treats
citizens of the same country differently than courts of the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits. This might not be a "circuit split" per se, but the issue does raise serious questions of
constitutional law. Future scholarship should tackle this diverging treatment of Section
1983. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); Adar, 639 F.3d at 181.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
238. Adar, 639 F.3d at 156.
239. Id. at 153.
240. See id. at 152 (supporting its claim that plaintiffs cannot invoke Section 1983 to
vindicate violations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Fifth Circuit held that the
clause merely "imposes an obligation on courts to afford sister-state judgments res judicata
effect" and "replace[s] the international law rule of comity"); but see U.S. CONsT. art. IV,§ 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws pre-
scribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof."). While the topic is outside of the scope of this Note, the history behind
the inclusion of the Clause in the Constitution and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Clause both suggest otherwise. See Adar, 639 F.3d at 152 (stating the common law
interpretation of "full faith and credit" was applicable only to judicial proceedings); see
also Ralph U. Witten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. Riv. 255, 258 (1998) (examining the origi-
nal interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its impact on issues relating to
the recognition of same-sex marriages across the states). With regard to history, the en
banc majority in Adar went to great lengths to identify the meaning assigned to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause by originalist scholars. See Adar, 639 F.3d at 152-53 (explaining
how the Supreme Court determined the meaning of the term "full faith and credit" to be
that "other states' courts were obliged 'to honor' the 'res judicata rules of the court that
rendered an initial judgment"') (quoting 18 CiiAiuis ALAN Wiicirr, ARTuR R. Mu.uimF
& EDWARD H. COOPER, FE.DERAL PRACfCF AND PROCEDURE § 4403, at 44 (2d ed. 2002);
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grounds, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the action should properly have
been brought in state court, subject to Supreme Court review.2 4 ' For the
above reasons, the court reversed the panel's holding.2 4 2
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943). However, the court makes an
unconvincing suggestion that the Full Faith and Credit Clause merely makes the common
law rule of res judicata the supreme law of the land. Adar, 639 F.3d at 153, cert. denied, 132
S.Ct. 400 (2011) ("[Tlhe full faith and credit clause brought to the [United States] a useful
means of ending litigation by making 'the local doctrines of res judicata . . . a part of
national jurisprudence."). The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose behind the
clause "was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties."
Milwaukee Cnty. v M.E. White Co., 296 US 268, 277 (1935). Hence, the Clause cannot be
seen as a mere codification of res judicata principles. U.S. CONs-r. art. IV § 1. As aptly
stated by the Fifth Circuit panel in Adar, res judicata is a state's "voluntary restraint" while
constitutionally prescribed full faith and credit is a "mandatory, constitutional curb" on
state sovereignty. Adar, 597 F.3d at 709-10 (distinguishing res judicata as a "voluntary
restraint" by a forum state, as opposed to the full faith and credit clause as a "mandatory,
constitutional curb" on state sovereignty). Unlike res judicata, which merely applies to
final judgments on the merits, the Full Faith and Credit Clause has been interpreted to also
apply to state laws unless the forum state is not "competent to legislate" in the field. Pac.
Emp'rs Ins. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n of California, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939). While
there are few, if any, such areas, the fact that the Full Faith and Credit Clause covers both
judgments and statutes makes it inherently broader in reach than common law principles
of res judicata. Shawn Gebhardt, Full Faith and Credit for Status Records: A Reconsidera-
tion of Gardiner, 97 CALIF. L. Ruv. 1419, 1435 (2009). Moreover, by holding that exacting
full faith and credit must be given to judgments, the Supreme Court has made clear that
the Clause goes further than ordinary principles of comity, which allow for disregard of a
foreign judgment that "violates an important public policy of the forum." Estin v. Estin,
334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (noting that the full faith and credit clause "substituted a com-
mand for the earlier principles of comity and thus basically altered the status of the States
as independent sovereigns") (emphasis added); Baker v. Gen. Motors, 522 U.S. 222, 233
(1998) (holding that there exists "no roving 'public policy exception' to the full faith and
credit due judgments"). Examination and explication of the differences between the prin-
ciples of res judicata and comity on the one hand, and those of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause on the other, is an important project for scholars and judges alike. In the en banc
court's quest to prove that Section 1983 does not apply to alleged violations of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, the court unnecessarily narrowed the meaning of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. Future decisions should address the issue with further specificity to
ensure that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not stand as a mere empty shell or a
simple reminder of our federalist system.
241. Adar, 639 F.3d at 151 ("Because the clause guides rulings in courts, the 'right' it
confers on a litigant is to have a sister state judgment recognized in courts of the subse-
quent forum state. The forum's failure properly to accord full faith and credit is subject to
ultimate review by the Supreme Court of the United States.").
242. Id. at 162.
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IV. SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT (No PUN INTENDED)
Adar and Finstuen were based on similar factual scenarios.2 43 Yet,
while the couple in Finstuen walked away with a supplemental birth cer-
tificate reflecting both parents' names, due to the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari, the Adar plaintiffs ultimately lost their battle.2 4 4 Interest-
ingly, the courts agreed on the scope of constitutional full faith and credit.
According to the en banc court, the inconsistency in treatment then came
down to one difference between the cases: the fact that "Louisiana law,
unlike Oklahoma law, [did] not require issuing birth certificates to two
unmarried individuals."2 4 5 However, closer inspection of the implicated
Oklahoma and Louisiana laws reveals their remarkable similarities. In
fact, as this Note will point out, neither state prevents unmarried individ-
uals from obtaining supplemental birth certificates of their adopted child.
The unsupported conclusions of the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in
Adar misconstrued and unnecessarily confused established Louisiana law
with respect to the eligibility of unmarried adoptive couples to obtain
revised birth records for their children. The following sections summarize
the agreed-upon meaning of recognition and enforcement in the adoption
context and explain the errors in statutory interpretation made by the
Adar court.
A. Recognition and Enforcement in the Adoption Context
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court has distinguished be-
tween recognition and enforcement in defining the reach of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. 2 46 The Clause constitutionally mandates exacting rec-
ognition of out-of-state judgments. 2" Enforcement measures, on the
other hand, are outside of the reach of full faith and credit and "remain
subject to the evenhanded control of forum law." 2 4 8
Both Finstuen and Adar adopt these distinctions.2 49 In Finstuen the
Tenth Circuit held that "final adoption orders and decrees are judgments
that are entitled to recognition by all other states under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause." 2so The court further acknowledged that "Oklahoma con-
tinues to exercise authority over . . . the rights and obligations in
243. See id. at 149; Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1301 (10th Cir. 2007).
244. Adar v. Smith, 132 U.S. 400 (2011) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
245. Adar, 639 F.3d at 157.
246. Baker, 522 U.S. at 223-24.
247. Id. at 223.
248. Id. at 224.
249. Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1153-54.
250. Id. at 1156.
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Oklahoma flowing from an adoptive relationship."2 5 ' Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit went out of its way to reiterate that it "maintain[s] a stark distinc-
tion between recognition and enforcement of judgments under the [Flull
[F]aith and [C]redit [C]lause.' 2 52 It expressly stated that "[f]orum state
law governs the incidental benefits of a foreign judgment." 2 5 3
The cases suggest that in the context of out-of-state adoptions, recogni-
tion under the Full Faith and Credit Clause merely requires the forum
state to refrain from terminating the relationship established by the for-
eign adoption decree between the adoptive parents and their child. On
the other hand, enforcement of the judgment-i.e. the grant of positive
rights and duties to adoptive parents-rests with the state. 25 4 This frame-
work contradicts the Louisiana Attorney General's view that the state "is
not required to recognize an adoption by a same[-]sex couple . . .. "
Unlike Charles C. Foti, Jr., former Attorney General of Louisiana, Fin-
stuen and Adar use this framework correctly, by recognizing the adoptive
parent status created by the respective adoption decrees. 5 6 In terms of
enforcement, however, Finstuen held that Oklahoma law assigned the
right to obtain a revised birth certificate to all couples, irrespective of
marital status.2 57 Adar, on the other hand, ruled that Louisiana law did
not. 5 The following section compares the Oklahoma and Louisiana
laws and shows that Adar incorrectly interpreted Louisiana law.
251. Id. at 1154.
252. Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 160 (5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).
253. Id. at 161.
254. See id. at 151-52; Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1153-54. This framework, which was
adopted by Finstuen and Adar alike, could have potentially disastrous effects on some
groups of adoptive parents. With so many rights and privileges of parenthood being codi-
fied in statutes, many adoptive parents could be deprived of these rights at the state's
whim. For example, if, as in Adar, a state were to limit the definition of the term "adoptive
parents" to opposite-sex married couples, same-sex couples that jointly adopt a child out-
of-state could find themselves in a situation where a co-parent is deprived hospital visita-
tion rights or denied the right to make educational decisions for his or her child. Ulti-
mately, an out-of-state adoption decree would become merely a piece of paper that
certifies an imaginary relationship without any practical consequences. Whether such un-
derstanding makes the Full Faith and Credit Clause (with its mere recognition principles) a
powerless doctrine is a topic for further research. Scholars and judges should thoroughly
reevaluate where constitutionally mandated recognition stops and statutorily mandated en-
forcement begins.
255. Op. La Att'y Gen. 06-0325, at 3 (2007), available at http://www.ag.state.1a.us/
Shared/ViewDoc.aspx?Type=4&Doc=18900.
256. Adar, 639 F.3d at 152, 154.
257. Crutcher, 496 F.3d at 1141.
258. Adar, 639 F.3d at 157.
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B. Adar's Mistaken View of Louisiana Law
In refusing to order the State Registrar to issue a revised birth certifi-
cate, the Adar court called Louisiana's records and adoption laws "criti-
cally different" from the Oklahoma laws implicated in Finstuen. 259 Aside
from this conclusory statement, the Adar court never actually discussed
these fictional differences. In fact, a thorough examination reveals that
Oklahoma and Louisiana's laws governing adoption and issuance of sup-
plemental birth certificates are remarkably similar. First, neither
Oklahoma nor Louisiana allowed joint in-state adoptions by unmarried
couples when the two cases were decided.2 60 Second, both states' laws
mandated the State Registrars to place the names of both adoptive par-
ents on supplemental birth certificates upon receipt of the proper evi-
dence of foreign adoption.' Specifically, the Oklahoma law requested
259. Adar, 639 F.3d at 157 (quoting the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the ruling in
Finstuen).
260. See Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 04-008, at 2 (2004), available at 2004 WL 557472, (list-
ing those not allowed to adopt a child in Oklahoma).
261. Note that neither state grants its State Registrar the discretion to subjectively
decide to whom to issue a supplemental birth certificate or the power to create extra-
statutory criteria to issue one. See OKLA. ST-IAT. tit. 63, § 1-316(A)(1) (2004); LA. RIv.
STAT. ANN. § 40:76(C) (2012). In fact, in both instances, the Registrar must act and issue a
supplemental birth certificate upon the presentation of proper evidence of out-of-state
adoption. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-316(A)(1) (2004); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:76(C)
(2012). In the case of Oklahoma, by using the word "shall," the pertinent statute orders
the Registrar to issue a revised birth certificate once the adoptive parents submit "[ain
adoption certificate ... or a certified copy of the decree of adoption." OKLA. STAT. tit. 63,
§ 1-316(A)(1) (2004). Similarly, in the case of Louisiana the statute prescribes that "[u]pon
receipt of the certified copy of the decree, the state registrar shall make a new record in its
archives" and "shall issue to the adoptive parents a certified copy of the new record." LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:76(C) (2012) (emphasis added); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:77 (2012)
(emphasis added). In another instance, the Louisiana law states that "the state registrar
may create a new record of birth." In another instance, the Louisiana law states that "the
state registrar may create a new record of birth." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:76(A) (2012)
(emphasis added) (quoting the responsibility of the state registrar). As the panel decision
of the Fifth Circuit aptly pointed out, the mere use of the word "may" in the statute does
not give the Louisiana Registrar "unfettered discretion to issue or not to issue a birth
certificate." Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697, 716 (5th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added), rev'd en
banc, 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting the court's rebuttal of the state registrar's argu-
ment). Because such reading would improperly delegate legislative authority to the state
Registrar, a more narrow understanding, which "affords the Registrar the limited discre-
tion of determining whether the certification furnished by the applicants is satisfactory," is
appropriate. See id. at 716, 718 (noting that the Supreme Court of Louisiana has created a
three-prong test to determine unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, under
which the "[d]elegation of authority to an administrative agency is constitutionally valid if
the enabling statute (1) contains a clear expression of legislative policy, (2) prescribes suffi-
cient standards to guide the agency in the execution of that policy, and (3) is accompanied
by adequate procedural safeguards to protect against abuse of discretion by the agency");
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issuance of a new birth certificate "with the names of the adoptive parents
listed as the parents." 2 6 2 The Louisiana statute likewise mandated the
recording of "[t]he names of the adoptive parents."2 6 3 Third, both
Oklahoma and Louisiana's statutes failed to define the phrase "adoptive
parents." 2 64 This raises the question of why the Adar court ruled differ-
ently than the Tenth Circuit in Finstuen.
For the Adar defendants, the meaning of the phrase "adoptive parents"
was the crux of the conflict. In that case the Louisiana State Registrar
refused to issue a supplemental birth certificate listing both plaintiffs pre-
cisely because, in her interpretation of the law, the words "adoptive par-
ents" did not include unmarried couples.265 In its holding, the Fifth
Circuit adopted this logic and ruled that "Louisiana law, unlike
Oklahoma law, [did] not require issuing birth certificates to two unmar-
ried individuals." 2 66 This is simply not true with regard to Louisiana law.
The Fifth Circuit, without explanation or mention of any method of statu-
tory interpretation, arrived at the above conclusion by combining two
Louisiana statutes, each from a different code. 2 67 The first law, codified
in the Louisiana Revised Statutes, governs foreign adoptions and allows
for the creation of a new birth record for a Louisiana-born child adopted
out-of-state.2 6 The second, present in the Louisiana Children's Code,
limits the availability of joint adoption to married couples. 69 In its con-
clusion, the court improperly adopted the view of the State Registrar that
the term "adoptive parents" in the Revised Statutes "means married par-
ents, because in Louisiana, only married couples may jointly adopt a
child." 27 0 Interpreted appropriately it becomes obvious that the term
"adoptive parents" under Louisiana law applies to any person made a
parent by an adoption decree, irrespective of marital status.
Louisiana v. All Pro Paint & Body Shop, 639 So.2d 707, 711 (La. 1994) (formulating the
preceding test). Hence, assuming that proper documentation is provided, both Oklahoma
and Louisiana's laws require the Registrar to issue a revised birth certificate.
262. OKILA. SrXr. tit. 10, § 7505-6.6(B) (2007) (emphasis added).
263. LA. Riv. STrA c. ANN. § 40:76(C) (2012) (emphasis added).
264. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7501-1.3 (2011); Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697, 715 (5th Cir.
2010) ("The Registrar does not offer, and our research does not reveal, any place where
the phrase 'adoptive parents' is expressly defined in the Louisiana Civil Code, the State's
statutes, or the case law.").
265. Adar, 639 F.3d at 149-50.
266. Id. at 157.
267. Id. at 161.
268. LA. Riv. STA r. ANN. § 40:76 (A), (C) (2010) ("[The state registrar may create a
new record of birth in the archives upon presentation of a properly certified copy of the
final decree of adoption . . . showing . . . [tihe names of the adoptive parents.").
269. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1221 (2004) ("A single person, eighteen years or
older, or a married couple jointly may petition to privately adopt a child.").
270. Adar, 639 F.3d at 149-50.
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The en banc court and the Louisiana State Registrar incorrectly inter-
preted the term "adoptive parents" under Section 40:76(C) of the Re-
vised Statutes in pari materia with Article 1221 of the Children's Code.2 7
The Louisiana Civil Code states that "[laws on the same subject matter
must be interpreted in reference to each other." 27 2 This statute, however,
has no relevance to the issue at hand because the two statutes do not deal
with the same subject matter. 7 One statute, titled "Record of foreign
adoptions," deals with record keeping and recognition of out-of-state
adoptions.2 74 The other, titled "Persons who may petition for adoption,"
deals with in-state eligibility to adopt.2 75 Because one statute concerns
the subject matter of full faith and credit and the other the subject matter
of in-state eligibility to adopt, the two are different and cannot be inter-
preted in pari materia with one another.
In any event, the state's supreme court has limited the applicability of
this rule of interpretation to instances where there is ambiguity pre-
sent." In all other instances, the words of a statute are to be read "ac-
cording to their general and popular use." 2 7 7  Merriam-Webster's
Collegiate Dictionary defines "ambiguity" as something "that can be un-
derstood in two or more possible senses or ways." 2 78 The term "adoptive
parents" in Section 40:76 has only one meaning. It cannot be read as "a
couple eligible to jointly adopt in Louisiana" when the statute deals with
recognition of adoptions performed by foreign courts. While both the
Fifth Circuit panel and five judges dissenting to the en banc opinion rec-
ognized this and expressly noted that the term "adoptive parents" is un-
ambiguous, the en banc majority did not even touch on the subject of
271. See LA. Rtnv. STAT. ANN. § 40:76(C) (2010); LA. Cimiin. Comq ANN. art. 1221
(2004).
272. LA. Civ. CoDE ANN. art. 13 (1999) (emphasis added).
273. See Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697, 718 (5th Cir. 2010) (doubting the relevance of
reading the two statutes in tandem).
274. LA. RiEv. STAT. ANN. § 40:76 (2010).
275. LA. CHILD. Coo ANN. art. 1221 (2004).
276. Crescionne v. La. State Police Ret. Bd., 455 So.2d 1362, 1363 (La. 1984):
While it is true that the Civil Code directs that laws on the same subject matter should
be construed with reference to one another, it is also true that it is only when one
statute is unclear that another on the same subject should be called in aid to explain it.
Otherwise, where there is no ambiguity, the words of a statute are to be read in their
most usual significance, that is, according to their general and popular use.
(citations omitted).
277. Id.
278. Ambiguity Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/ambiguity (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). Louisiana courts use the same test of
ambiguity in interpreting the language of contracts. See, e.g., Bowab v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 152 So. 2d 66, 73 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (defining the "common-sense test of
ambiguity" as being "susceptible of two reasonable constructions").
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statutory interpretation.' Accordingly, because the statute deals with
foreign adoptions, in its general use, the term "adoptive parents" must be
measured by an all-inclusive national standard not a limiting state-specific
standard.
Alternatively, assuming arguendo that the two statutes are in fact inter-
preted in pari materia with one another, the law nonetheless cannot be
read as denying unmarried out-of-state adoptive parents access to supple-
mental birth certificates. The en banc court, without explanation, read
Article 1221 as a limitation on Section 40:76.280 Contrarily, as shown be-
low, proper reading of Louisiana law suggests that Section 40:76 must be
read as an extension of Article 1221. Because each state may choose to
implement a different adoption process, as suggested by the Restatement
(First) of Conflict of Laws, it is not the process, but the resulting "status
of adoption" that is common to all states of the union.81 In adopting a
statute dealing with a situation "[w]here a person born in Louisiana is
adopted in a court of proper jurisdiction in any other state," Louisiana
acknowledged (and did not question) a foreign courts ability to create
such status of adoption.2 s2 Instead of doubting the process and choosing
to re-litigate each adoption according to its own whim, Louisiana chose to
trust the courts of its sister states.283 Accordingly, irrespective of the limi-
tations imposed on in-state adoption, Section 40:76 extends status of
adoption to anyone who gains such status "in a court of proper jurisdic-
tion in any other state." 28 4 The Adar plaintiffs gained such status in New
York courts. Accordingly, Louisiana should have issued them a revised
birth certificate reflecting both parents' names.
279. Adar, 639 F.3d at 181.
280. See id. at 161. "In this case, Louisiana does not permit any unmarried couples-
whether adopting out-of-state or in-state-to obtain revised birth certificates with both par-
ents' names on them." Id.
281. See RESTATEMENT (FIRsr) O, CONFLIC' OF LAWS § 143 (1934) ("The status of
adoption, created by the law of a state having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the
same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when
created by its own law.").
282. LA. Ra~v. STATr. ANN. § 40:76(A) (2010) (emphasis added).
283. See id. (requiring no more than a "certified copy of the final decree of adoption"
or "certified statement from the record custodian attesting to the adoption decree" for the
issuance of a new birth record in Louisiana). Note that Adar suggests that relitigation of a
foreign adoption decree would amount to non-recognition and be unconstitutional under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Adar, 639 F.3d at 152. "The Registrar concedes it is
bound by the New York adoption decree, such that the parental relationship of Adar and
Smith with Infant J cannot be relitigated in Louisiana." Id.
284. LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 40:76(A) (2010).
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V. CONCLUSION
Every state recognizes the concept of adoption. 28 5 With some states
allowing same-sex couples to jointly adopt children and others fighting
tooth and nail to keep homophobic laws on the books, interstate move-
ment can raise issues regarding the validity of out-of-state adoption de-
crees. Two circuit level decisions exemplify the problems created by such
inconsistent state laws-Finstuen v. Crutcher and Adar v. Smith.2 86 In
Finstuen, three same-sex couples adopted children out-of-state and ap-
plied for revised birth certificates reflecting the adoptive parents'
names." Following a long legal battle, the Tenth Circuit ordered the
issuance of new birth certificates for two of those families.2 88 In Adar,
based on similar facts, the Fifth Circuit refused to order Louisiana to is-
sue a revised record of birth.289 This apparently dissimilar treatment
raises questions about the reach of constitutional full faith and credit and
the role of state laws governing issuance of supplemental birth
certificates.
Interestingly, Finstuen and Adar agree on the scope of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause in the adoption context. Both cases hold that the Con-
stitution mandates exacting recognition of out-of-state adoption de-
crees. 2 9 However, the cases add that any privileges stemming from or
incidental to such status fall outside of the reach of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause and are governed by state law. These are considered mea-
sures of enforcement and cannot be challenged on constitutional full faith
and credit grounds. According to Adar, it was precisely the difference
between Oklahoma's and Louisiana's laws that caused the opposite re-
sults of the two cases.2 9 1
However, closer inspection reveals that the Oklahoma and Louisiana
laws governing adoption and issuance of revised birth certificates are re-
markably similar.29 2 In fact, both states' laws permit issuance of supple-
mental birth certificates to all out-of-state adoptive parents, irrespective
285. See Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YAuE L.
J. 715, 725 (1950) ("Adoption by deed persisted in other states for many years thereafter,
but such provisions have gradually been repealed, and today every state requires that
adoption be by judicial proceeding.").
286. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
287. Id. at 1142.
288. Id. at 1156.
289. Adar, 639 F.3d at 146-47.
290. See id. at 151.
291. Id. at 157.
292. See generally OKLA. STATr. tit. 63, § 1-316 (2004); LA. Rev. STATr. ANN.
§ 40:76(C) (2012).
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of sex or marital status. 93 With minimal explanation, the Adar court hur-
riedly arrived at the wrong result because it used unorthodox statutory
interpretation. It is quite unfortunate that today, under Adar, Louisiana
law denies all out-of-state same-sex adoptive parents the chance of ob-
taining revised Louisiana birth certificates. By denying certiorari, the Su-
preme Court allowed this incorrect reading of Louisiana law to negatively
affect the gay and lesbian community for years to come.
293. OKIA. Siwr. tit. 63, § 1-316 (2004) (notes of decision); LA. RIv. S'AT. ANN.
§ 40:75 (2012).
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